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ABSTRACT
The CIA and its covert actions have been oft criticized. After serious
Congressional oversight was established in 1976-77 (The Year of Intelligence) covert
actions by the Agency tapered off. Did this mean the loss of a powerful tool because of
Congressional meddling in foreign affairs or simply the retiring of outmoded practices?
Have covert actions conducted in the 1980s including Afghanistan and Nicaragua been
successful and will they need to continue now that the United States has become the
sole superpower? Proposals to drastically restructure the CIA such as those of Daniel
Patrick Moynihan are examined. The methodology will include a definition of covert
actions and an examination of the definition of success in covert actions. The success
of covert actions will be looked at from several perspectives including short, medium,
and long term time frames.
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C hapter I

A D efin itio n

Covert actions did not suddenly come about with the creation of the CIA in
1947. The attempt to affect political goals by covert means goes back much farther.
Spy craft goes back to revolutionary days and "the United States' achievement of
independence owed much to espionage and covert actions."1 Though modeled after the
older Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the CIA would approach covert actions and
intelligence functions as a bureaucratic institution, an institution under more direct
control of the executive and much less aligned with the military.
The surprise at Pearl Harbor is generally credited with convincing the nation's
policy makers that a permanent coordinated intelligence agency was needed. The OSS
was a war time intelligence unit with a fair degree of success at small scale covert
actions. It was not clear at first if the newly created CIA would engage in covert
actions at all, but under the pressures of a rapidly forming Cold War there was little
doubt.

Legal History

The statutory history of covert action covers about half a century. The actual
legal authority to conduct covert actions comes from a small section of the National
Security Act of 1947:

1

... to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national
security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

Covert actions themselves, as the "other such functions" came to be defined, were not
spelled out until 1948. Covert actions lacked an actual definition. The entire
justification for the CIA to engage in secretive political actions was tied to an
ambiguous clause. "Other functions" could easily have supported simple clandestine
intelligence operations without giving any provision for more elaborate measures such
as influencing Italian elections in 1948 or overthrowing governments in Iran and
Guatemala.
The first general counsel for the CIA had doubts about any justification of
covert operations under the National Security Act. Directive NSC 4 indicated a need
for using covert psychological warfare. According to Lawrence Houston, the general
counsel, there was "nothing in the specific language of the legislation that specifically
gave us authority for such activities."2 Houston went on to assert that "either
[propaganda or commando type] activity would be an unwarranted extension of the
functions authorized by" the act. He did not believe "that there was any thought in the
minds of Congress that the Central Intelligence Agency under this authority would take
positive action for subversion and sabotage."3 Still the young CIA was being directed
to engage in covert psychological warfare, essentially propaganda, in an attempt to
defeat strong communist parties in Italy and France.
After some analysis Houston found that as long as "the President gave us the
proper directive and the Congress gave us the money for those purposes, we had the
administrative authority to carry them out."4 Essentially the CIA's entire authority
relied upon executive orders and the tacit consent of Congress to allow them to engage
in covert actions. While this was a great power for the President, it allowed almost no
role for Congress, a situation which would only be corrected in the mid 1970s.
Basically the President was allowed to wage covert wars and propaganda campaigns
without needing assistance from Congress. A wonderful tool, it would only seriously

begin to be questioned with the dramatic failure at the Bay of Pigs. For a time the Cold
War made it a perfectly acceptable situation. Still the argument that there was no
authority for the CIA to engage in covert actions has been overturned largely by
precedence.
NSC 10/2 was to contain the first true definition of these "other functions" in
June of 1948. The "vicious covert activities of the USSR" prompted the U.S. to
follow suit. Covert actions were finally defined as:
5. As used in this directive, "covert operations" are understood to be all activities (except as
noted herein) which conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states
or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and
executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized
persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility
for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to:
propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage,
demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to
underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of
indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such
operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter
espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.

There is an obvious emphasis on plausible deniability. To be truly covert an operation
would have to be completely secret from the targeted state or group. Even a relatively
uninvolved paramilitary operation in Guatemala could be easily assigned to the United
States. Before any covert action is taken there is generally already an air of hostility
between the two states. When the U.S. undertakes an operation against some small
Latin American country, it is easy for the country to blame the U.S. Thus any covert
action especially involving paramilitary style campaigns or large amounts of money and
agents will be exposed eventually. Thus for the U.S. government the key was to be
able to deny the operation with a straight face, knowing that no indisputable evidence
would be presented. As long as the covert action could plausibly be denied, it was
"covert" under this definition.
The line between covert and overt begins to fade out at this point. It no longer
has to be a secret operation at all. Full scale wars can be carried out by proxies without
invalidating the covert status. As long as the operation cannot be directly traced to the

U.S. government it is for all practical purposes covert. Obviously the doctrine of
plausible deniability was largely held to protect the President. Angelo Codevilla refers
to covert actions as merely denoting "some of the less-then-blatant ways in which it
was interfering in the internal affairs of other countries."5 In many ways it was a sort
of undeclared warfare option for the President
This definition of covert actions contains only political actions while not
including covert intelligence gathering operations. The distinction between intelligence
and covert actions is often overlooked. Obviously covert collection was to be
considered a proper role for the CIA, but it had little to do with covert actions, beyond
the nature of secrecy, a secrecy that was often much more important in small covert
collection operations than large paramilitary adventures that were impossible to hide.
Importantly, counter-intelligence functions are specifically dropped as well.
The only relation is the relative secrecy in which they must be pursued. Their object is
not to influence any foreign government beyond removing foreign spies. While these
spies may be providing important intelligence, their elimination is not meant to
influence foreign governments. Obviously leaving a foreign nation in the dark by
discovering many of their spies, could have large effects on a state's foreign policy, but
the intent is specifically to protect U.S. intelligence.
Finally, the military is cut out of any covert actions pursued by the CIA. The
last sentence states in plain language that "such operations shall not include armed
conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and
deception for military operations." The CIA alone would be in charge of covert
actions. Obviously any actual military involvement would significantly up the ante
upon exposure of an operation. If U.S. military officers or soldiers were killed and
found by an enemy, that state could easily consider this an act of war by the U.S., a
significant raising of the stakes. The military's exclusion does not keep them from
conducting operations, but the military is largely separated from covert operations.

Any missions conducted by the military would be overt or at least not subject to
plausible denial by the President.
NSC 5412 made small changes in the definition of covert actions. Covert
actions were defined as:
Propaganda, political action; economic warfare; escape and evasion and evacuation measures;
subversion against hostile state or groups including assistance to underground movements,
guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; support of indigenous and anti-communist elements
in threatened countries of the free world; deception plans and operations; and all activities
compatible with this directive necessary to accomplish the foregoing.

This definition is considerably shorter than that of NSC 10/2. Some of the listings
such as preventative direct action have been dropped, but the list of activities is
generally similar. The emphasis is on supporting paramilitary groups, specifically
"indigenous and anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world."
The grip of the Cold War still clings to the definitions of covert actions. Finally, to
make up for a lack of inclusiveness, and to provide a measure of ambiguity, there is the
last clause, "all activities compatible with this directive necessary to accomplish the
foregoing." This catch all phrase justifies almost any covert action, plausibly even
assassination or other more extreme measures.
The Hughes-Ryan Act offered the first limitations of covert actions. It was
passed as an Amendment of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. The pressure for
Hughes-Ryan had come from publication of allegations of massive CIA interference in
Chile. It would be only the first of many steps to rein in the CIA in the next few years.
Section 662 reads:
Limitation on Intelligence Activities-No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any
other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations
in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence,
unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national
security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of each
operation to the appropriate committees of Congress...

Obviously it was intended to attack the notion of plausible deniability. If the President
had to authorize every covert operation then he could no longer plausibly deny

knowledge of a particular operation at least to the members of Congress that had to be
informed. Unfortunately the phrase "in a timely fashion" has been open to debate. The
Act also follows the narrow definition of covert actions. Covert operations whose sole
purpose was to gather intelligence were excluded from these findings, and there was no
need to report them to Congress.
Hughes-Ryan also marked the first time Congress had tried to define covert
actions since 1947. It expanded on the "other functions" definition while remaining
quite inclusive. In doing so it also reaffirmed its acceptance of covert actions which
Congress had never explicitly authorized in law.

Covert operations were any

operations conducted in foreign countries that had a purpose other then intelligence
gathering. It is still unclear if these operations were to have a political purpose in terms
of influencing some other nation, though it can almost be assumed.
Executive order no. 11905, issued by Gerald Ford and reaffirmed by Carter and
Reagan, defined the limitations on covert actions further. The order stated that "no
employee of the United States Government shall engage in or conspire to engage in,
political assassination." Obviously there were some limits to covert operations, though
there truly had been no limits through the fifties and sixties when Congress looked the
other way. Ford eager to deflect criticism from the Agency issued the order largely as a
gesture towards Congress that the executive could keep the Agency in check. The
order meant litde since the CIA had already abandoned assassinations. As it stands the
ban on assassinations could be overridden by any President willing to issue an
executive order. Both Reagan and Bush have also engaged in what amounted to
assassination attempts against Colonel Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein, though Bush
attempted such after receiving Congressional support for the Gulf War.
After the establishment of both the Senate and House Intelligence committees
Carter issued an executive order in January of 1978. This executive order, No. 12063,
outlined in detail many restrictions on the CIA. The order deals mostly with

intelligence, but there are some mentions of covert actions, which are referred to as
"other matters" in the document. Plausible denial is dealt another blow by Section 1808 which allows the CIA to "conduct special activities approved by the President and
carry out such activities consistent with applicable law." The CIA is given sole
authority for special activities under Section 2-306, except for "the military services in
wartime." The order also sets up another advisory board, this time named the
President's Intelligence Oversight Board. Finally specific restrictions on the CIA are
mentioned. According to Jeffreys-Jones "the prohibitions--on assassination, drug
experiments, and other malpractices—were not new, but their restatement served notice
to the CIA that restraint was still required."6 The executive order was merely to
reaffirm some of the lessons learned in the "Year of Intelligence."
The 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act fleshed out the new relationship between
Congress and the CIA. It once again required reporting of covert actions in a timely
fashion, but to only the House and Senate Intelligence committees. "Illegal intelligence
activities" were to be reported, but there is little mention of any new definition of covert
actions. Had the Act passed in 1977 or 1978 it likely would have been quite a bit
stronger on intelligence oversight. By 1980 the consensus that the CIA need to be
reined in had largely disappeared and conservative critics were successful in watering
down the Act. The restricting of reporting to only two committees also helped to solve
the problem, or at least the perceived problem, of leaks. Many critics had attacked the
reporting policies. They claimed that reporting to eight separate committees was an
attempt to do away with covert actions altogether. Indeed they "charged that HughesRyan had severely curtailed foreign cooperation with U.S. intelligence agencies."7 By
making the possibilities of leaks large, any effective covert action would have to be
capable of surviving public exposure.
Reagan followed in December of 1981 with yet another executive order on
Intelligence, No. 12333. The Reagan order did little to change covert actions. It

retained the ban on assassination, a ban that had obtained momentum, since any
withdrawal of the ban would be a public relations disaster. The relevant section was
Section 1.8 (e):
Conduct special activities approved by the President No agency except the CIA (or the
Armed Forces of the United States in a time of war declared by Congress or during any period
covered by a report from the President to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution (87
Stat. 855)) may conduct any special activity unless the President determines that another
agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective.

This reinforces the death of plausible deniability. It also reflects Reagan's acceptance
of "overt" covert operations. Gregory Treverton remarks that "by the middle of the
1980s, what was striking about major covert actions was how little about it was secret;
American operations—from Nicaragua to Angola to Cambodia—were openly debated."8
Reagan was not worried about denying any operations, except perhaps in the case of
Iran-Contra, he wished to use covert actions to educate and underscore American
concerns. In an interview in 1987, the new Director of Central Intelligence, William
Webster, stated that in his view "Congress has intended that the president be on the line
for any special activities in the intelligence field beyond mere collection of
intelligence."9 Plausible denial was no longer an important policy, now giving merely
a possibility for the U.S. government to distance itself from a given action.
The order also includes two notable features in relation to the Reagan
presidency. First, Reagan mentions the War Powers Resolution in his order. Reagan
had an interest in denying the War Powers Resolution any legitimacy, arguing that it
was inherently unconstitutional by infringing on the rights of the Executive as the
Commander in Chief. Second, is the reiteration that the CIA was the only agency that
could conduct covert action unless the President decided another agency was more
suited to the task. In the wake of the Iran-Contra affair and the activities of the National
Security Council this statement seems almost omniscient, even though at the time it was
merely seen as a reiteration of the standing practice to assign all covert actions to the
CIA.

The key policy of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 was to define the
"timely fashion" statement of the Hughes-Ryan Act. The decided time frame was 48
hours, but pressure from the Bush administration almost kept the statement from
making its way into law. Bush pocket vetoed the measure arguing that interpreting "in
a timely fashion" as within a few days "would unconstitutionally infringe on the
authority of the president and impede any administration's effective implementation of
covert action programs."10 It would pass the next year in a similar form. With regard
to intelligence functions the President was advised to "keep the intelligence committees
fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities." The language is slightly
stronger than the prior "timely fashion," but it is not completely restrictive. Covert
action would be held to a higher standard, the lessons of Iran-Contra still in the recent
past.
The "timely fashion" statement of Hughes-Ryan had obviously been abused, so
Congress finally set about limiting the time frame. The finding could be "made and
shall be reduced to a written finding as soon as possible but in no event more than 48
hours after the decision is made." Obviously any large scale operations could not be
hidden from Congress, besides a possible rescue attempt. There would be a written
record of any covert activities conducted against a foreign nation.
For the first time since Congress had inadvertently created covert actions in the
1947 National Security Act, the 1991 Act defined covert actions. The definition is
essentially a negative one, of what did not constitute a covert action:
(e) As used in this title, the term 'covert action' means an activity or activities of the United
States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is
intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged
publicly, but does not include(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional
counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the
operational security of the United States Government programs, or administrative
activities;
(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;
(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government
law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or

(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities
described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of the United States government agencies
abroad.

The definition remarks on the supposed secrecy of covert actions with the terms "not
apparent or acknowledged publicly." Obviously the experience of the 1980s had
convinced Congress that covert actions, especially large ones, were not hidden affairs,
but took place in front of the world even if the U.S. Government officially denied
them. Counterintelligence and intelligence operations are of course dropped. An
interesting inclusion is the mention of traditional law enforcement activities, probably to
give leeway to agencies such as the DEA who have conducted programs abroad in
order to slow the flow of illegal drugs to the United States.

A Question of Definitions

Intelligence is a broad area in itself. Covert actions come underneath the large
umbrella of intelligence in many cases. For some it is natural to "include intelligence,
covert actions, and counter intelligence"11 under the definition of intelligence. This
conclusion is easy to reach by a simple cursory examination of the structure of
America's premier foreign intelligence agency, the CIA, which is involved in all three
areas.
Intelligence and covert actions are both foreign policy tools but one is active and
the other passive. Intelligence is the process of observation, clandestine or overt,
whereupon one may return with useful raw data on which to base future decisions. For
Sherman Kent, it is "high-level foreign positive intelligence,"12 since there is no need
to know U.S. intentions, and low level intelligence is largely useless.

Covert

operations are almost the antithesis of intelligence in setting out to change the political
realities of a given situation. Covert action is a form of foreign policy while intelligence

"was universally to be the CIA's central mission."13 The two lead an uneasy existence
within the confines of a single agency.
The term covert itself is not merely replaceable with secret. According to W.
Michael Reisman and James E. Baker "the factual property conveyed by the word
covert is that the action is accomplished in ways unknown to some parties (not
necessarily the targets)."14 This is much different than a truly secret mission, in that it
may be known to much of the world and even its targets without making it overt.
Especially in the last decade there has been little emphasis on secrecy within the large
scale actions conducted by the CIA in places such as Afghanistan and Nicaragua.
Of course covert actions can be defined by a simple listing of all included
functions, very much the dictionary definition. According to NSC 10/2 covert actions
include: "propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage,
anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states,
including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee
liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened
countries of the free world." This serves to define the possible actions that can be
accomplished covertly. The Twentieth Century Fund lists the various functions as
fitting under six areas: "paramilitary operations, propaganda and disinformation
campaigns, political action programs, economic warfare programs, special operations
in support of foreign governments, and maintenance of a secret infrastructure."15 Loch
Johnson in "Reflections on Covert Actions and Its Anxieties" lists a broad spectrum of
covert actions from "the giving of instruction and security equipment to enhance the
personal safety of friendly foreign leaders against threats to their lives"16 to "the
spreading of biological, chemical or other toxic substances to bring about widespread
death in the target nation."17 Still obviously these listed definitions can easily be
classified to see if they contain covert collection of intelligence along with more
politically oriented operations.

Covert actions have never been simple to define. They are "by definition, a
foreign policy instrument based upon secrecy and deception."18 In the largest sense
they can be anything that is done covertly. This is the broad definition of covert action.
Under this definition a spy overhearing a dinner conversation and a large scale
paramilitary operation such as the Contras in Nicaragua are essentially the same thing.
The broad definition of covert actions appears valid from a structural standpoint in the
CIA since " covert action on the one hand and covert collection or espionage on the
other are both carried out by the operations directorate."19 Still the definitions in
Executive orders, National Security Council Directives, and Acts of Congress seem to
provide a basis for a narrow definition of covert actions.
A narrower definition of covert action excludes those operations or activities
whose primary or sole purpose is the collection of intelligence. This is not an unusual
position to take and indeed is reflected in NSC 10/2 which first set out an actual
definition of covert activities. Nowhere is intelligence gathering mentioned as a part of
covert actions. The Hughes-Ryan act also explicitly leaves out any intelligence
gathering functions. Still the initial National Security Act of 1947 mentions an assumed
link between intelligence and covert actions referring to "other functions and duties
related to intelligence." Thus the common notion that intelligence and covert actions are
intimately related is not so easily dispelled.
The primary difference between the broad definition which includes all sorts of
clandestine collection activities is one of goals. The express purpose of propaganda,
assassination attempts, and paramilitary operations is to change the political scene.
Clandestine collection operations aim simply at conventional spying, gaining
information illicitly without detection. The difference between overt collection and
covert collection is minor, especially for the CIA. The goal is to provide substantial
finished intelligence, not to change the political atmosphere of a foreign nation. Indeed

the information gleaned from clandestine intelligence operations is often used to provide
tactical intelligence for covert actions intended to change the political scene.
By separating intelligence gathering operations from covert operations, the most
controversial part of the CIA can be separated and examined more closely. John
Horton, an Operations officer, argues that "what makes people uneasy or indignant is
the use of secret agents for political purposes, such as secret political war, commonly
referred to as covert action."20 Covert actions are where the vast majority of the
serious complaints about the CIA arise from. Indeed Jeffreys-Jones argues that "the
CIA’s foreign covert operations have frequently alienated foreign opinion,"21 though
these same nations often look the other way when they approve of the objectives.
There are problems on the intelligence side of the agency, primarily with projections
into the future, but these are understandable. Covert operations involve tactics that are
often hidden for fear of criticism should they be exposed. Obviously massive election
spending in Italy was likely to meet with public disapproval if exposed. Open
interference in foreign elections would likely never be tolerated by a foreign
government or its citizens, at the very least subjecting an aided party to massive
criticism. It is these covert actions which generated the controversies that led to the
"Year of Intelligence" and still cause debate today.
The separation seems quite natural despite the tradition of uniting operations and
intelligence under one agency in the U.S.--the CIA. Early on the Agency more strictly
separated operations from intelligence, though the Office of Policy Coordination was
finally dropped. The combination has often led an uneasy existence.

A Final Operational Definition

There are plenty of reasons to finally choose one definition of covert actions
over another. Maurice Tugwell and David Charters find difficulty with the definitions

of another euphemism for covert actions, special operations, finally concluding that
"some concepts defy precise definition, an it must be admitted that "special operations"
may be just such a concept."22 Loch Johnson also finds that the term '"covert action"
remains a complex—and sometimes-slippery phrase."23 Thus any single definition of
covert actions will never truly suffice. All that remains is to pick an operational
definition and stick to it.
A listing definition of covert actions seems somewhat appropriate, but hardly
inclusive or concise. A true list describing all possible covert actions in detail would be
entirely unwieldy. Just such a list is partially attempted in Loch Johnson's article "The
Bright Line of Covert Actions," though the list is truly an attempt at setting up a
moralistic scale of covert actions. Still even this list with its forty or so "rungs" is a bit
unwieldy. Also the list could easily mix in counter intelligence functions as well since
they must often be conducted in secrecy.
The broad definition includes covert actions merely as part of the larger
intelligence picture. Missions based solely on intelligence gathering are mixed with
large scale paramilitary adventures. This definition especially within the scope of a
single paper seems most unworkable. Essentially the two different goals of collection
and intervention make this broad definition a less than perfect choice.
A final narrow definition of covert actions seems the most plausible of choices.
Covert actions which have as an intent mere intelligence gathering are not much
different from overt intelligence gathering from a variety of open sources. Covert
intelligence gathering remains much closer to overt intelligence gathering then it does to
other covert actions with political goals. Thus the exclusion of covert intelligence
gathering and even counter intelligence operations can be easily justified. This
distinction serves as well to concentrate the focus on covert activities which are
controversial.

Covert action within the scope of this paper will be taken to be: An action
u n d ertak en in secret which will not be declared publicly, w ith the
express goal of influencing an o th er n atio n 's political personnel or
stru ctu re, and whose prim ary purpose is not intelligence gathering or
counterintelligence.

It will generally involve param ilitary operations or

election interference campaigns. Obviously this will narrow the realm of covert
actions down to the most controversial, including large scale paramilitary operations
and election projects, some of which will be examined in case studies.
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Chapter II

Measurement

Having arrived at a working definition of covert actions, the real question is how to
analyze covert actions, specifically success.

Success itself cannot be measured

quantitatively. Unlike defining covert actions by narrowing the definition, success has to
be measured using normative standards along with some quantitative measures. These
standards can obviously be disputed, and many successful covert actions might be seen as
unsuccessful using the admittedly limited criteria that will be employed.

The Perfect Covert Action

A perfect covert action is indeed an impossibility, but theoretically one can define
what would make up such an operation. It would have to succeed on a number of levels
beyond simple attainment of operational goals. CIA planners would need demigod like
wisdom to project into the future all of the possible implications of even a moderate
operation. Such an operation would have to meet the following criteria:
1. Mission must stay covert.
2. Any operational goals set in the planning stages must be met.
3. Foreign policy goals must be met.
4. The action must not violate America's democratic credentials, must meet international standards
of morality.
5. The end result must benefit the general population in the target nation.
6. The operation must produce positive effects even far into the future.

7. There must be an efficient expenditure of funds.

If such operations could be pulled off then the CIA would hardly elicit a whisper of
controversy. The problem is that such perfect operations do not exist.
Indeed many of the goals of an operation work at cross purposes. In order to keep
an action covert there must be an air of secrecy. Mere secrecy violates the spirit of
openness in the American republic. Certainly keeping an operation secret makes a covert
action a less then perfect option in the eyes of the international community. Thus the very
first criteria for a successful covert operation tends to violate the criteria that an operation
shouldn't violate American standards or those of the world community.
In order to build a more acceptable set of criteria, hierarchy can be introduced.
These criteria can be listed in order of importance. Obviously this is somewhat arbitrary,
but it can still be attempted:
1. Foreign policy goals must be met.
2. Operational goals must be m et
3. The operation must produce positive effects even far into the future.
4. The operation must stay covert.
5. The action must not violate America's democratic credentials, and should try to meet
international standards of morality.
6. There should be an efficient expenditure of funds.
7. The operation should benefit the general population of the target country.

The focus here is entirely from a U.S. perspective. For a U.S. policy maker this would
not be an unusual way to order the earlier list. The highest priority is given to U.S. foreign
policy goals. Even a botched covert action can serve foreign policy goals effectively. An
assassination attempt that is discovered and foiled can still warn the leader of a country that
the U.S. is very serious in its opposition to his/her policies and quickly convince the leader
to modify those policies. The attack on Libya in 1986, "a veiled assassination attempt,"!
helped to modify Qaddafi's terrorist support and to convince him that the American threat to
his rule was serious if he continued on his present course. The lowest priority is given to

the general population in the target nation. Many covert actions in the past have benefited
the elites of developing countries while doing nothing for the general population or making
their conditions more miserable. Still these covert actions have very often been deemed
successful in spite of this.
Ordering these criteria from the perspective of a target nation is very simple. The
highest priority would be given to increasing the welfare of the general population followed
by the need for the covert action to stay within the bounds of acceptable U.S. and
international morality. The rest the U.S. government's goals would mean very little to a
target nation. Unfortunately for these nations they are not in charge of planning at Langley.
The next step is to assign values to the various criteria. This serves to make
analysis a more definite process, and as well it enables future researchers to employ a
similar scale and compare the various final rankings in each category. All seven different
areas will be ranked according to importance and then be assigned values based on how
well their conditions were met. The rating system will remain relatively simple.
Each area will be assigned a positive or negative score. Foreign policy goals being
the most important will be assigned a score from +7 to -7. Operational goals will be
assigned a score from +6 to -6 and so on. This will result in an aggregate score for each
covert action from -28 to +28. A +28 score would indicate a perfect covert action. A -28
score would reflect an abysmal failure. For example a covert operation to defeat President
Xiter of Commoland might be ranked as so:
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Table 1 S a m p l e

Oparatlon

Foreign policy goals

+7

Operational goals

+4

Long term effects

+2

Covertness

+3

Democratic standards

-1

Efficient expenditure

-2

Benefit general population

0

Total for Commoland operation: +13

A +13 indicates a generally successful covert action. Such a scoring system makes it
possible to compare several different covert actions and conclude whether they were
successful or not based on some defined standards. By studying a number of cases using
such a scale a general grouping of operations could be set up from the most to the least
successful and including operations which hover near the zero score indicating a rather
mixed result A larger study done of all significant covert actions dating back to the CIA's
founding would produce a wealth of data from which to decide just how successful the
operations side of the Agency has been.
There are, however, a number of problems in creating such a scale. It can be
argued that many criteria have been left out, that foreign policy goals are underweighted, or
that items like democratic standards inherently add negative scores to the total. All of these
are valid criticisms. While the criteria set forth are not exhaustive they do seek to actively
measure the success or failure of covert actions and include all the major criteria such as the
meeting of operational and foreign policy goals. Many consider the meeting of foreign
policy goals as defining a successful operation despite any amount of "dirty tricks" and
general corruption or mismanagement of an operation. Assigning perhaps a weight of +15

to -15 to foreign policy would be to simplify the notion of success or failure in a given
covert action. As well, there are plenty of examples of successful operations that met
foreign policy goals that now seem less then complete successes, Iran and Guatemala being
the obvious examples. Lasdy, there are arguments that it is unfair to consider items such as
the meeting of democratic standards or how the general population of a target nation
benefited from a covert action. The insistence on secrecy in a democracy and the use of
anti-democratic measures to install democracies are some of the CIA's inherent
contradictions. Despite these contradictions the CIA has survived and grown for the last
fifty years. So while a given action may succeed the use of extreme measures such as
assassination may come back to haunt the U.S. later, thus the need for measuring success
and failure of maintaining democratic standards. So while there are problems with such a
scale they do not outweigh the usefulness of the scale.

D efining Success

The difficulty in deciding whether a given covert operation was successful or not is
not new. Even models of success such as the Iran operation in 1953 have been reevaluated
in light of more recent developments. Revolutionaries in Iran in 1979 "vividly remembered
the 1953 coup and the CIA's role in it. The acronym "CIA," displayed on so many of the
street demonstrators' placards, encapsulated Iranian anti-Americanism. "2 There is also the
commonly asserted position within the Agency that many of the CIA's successes have
never come to light. Whether this is a factual statement is debatable. The likelihood of
large scale successful operations never coming to light seems quite small.
Small scale tactical operations in wartime are quite easy to assign success or failure
to. The goals are limited and well defined. The scope of these operations is often quite
small with easily obtainable goals. A single operation is unlikely to dramatically influence

the course of a war. In larger strategic operations success must be defined as meeting a
number of criteria.
Success can easily be expanded beyond operational goals. Foreign policy goals can
be ascertained. An unsuccessful operation can still have important intended foreign policy
effects. Did the operation succeed from this stand point? Was U.S. foreign policy
advanced or hindered by a blundered operation or even a successful operation that became
exposed? And no matter how controversial and exposed the covert action may become,
were U.S. policy goals served?
One definition of success from the U.S. perspective is whether or not it met U.S.
foreign policy goals. Since most covert actions set forth goals that will influence foreign
nations, the government necessarily expects these actions to bring about a more favorable
climate. Thus if a covert action is operationally successful, it is likely to be successful as
well from a foreign policy standpoint. Only rarely do successful operations cause
problems for the U.S. government and often it is merely disapproval at the domestic level
with the means or goals of an operation. Raising costs for the enemy as in Angola and in
Laos are cynical ventures never very popular since there is no chance of victory for the
proxy guerrillas.^
Part of success is secrecy. In succeeding has the covert operation become revealed
to the world? Admittedly most covert actions of a large scale nature can be attributed to the
U.S., but it is important to note if incontrovertible evidence comes to the fore. A covert
operation that has not succeeded in staying covert is merely a U.S. operation. This may be
less important if the goal of the covert action is actually more for education or as an
example to other parties.
Within the realm of cost-benefit analysis is the decision of whether the money spent
on a covert action was actually worth the effect produced. Was the overthrow of a
government worth the millions spent considering the relative importance of a small Third
World country? Were funds spent efficiently, or was money handed out like candy? After
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defining success more broadly and picking a number of criteria, one can get a better
measure of whether an individual covert action was indeed successful.

Goals: Foreign Policy and Operational

Goals in operations and foreign policy are often easy to enumerate. Operational
goals simply define what will be considered a successful mission. Foreign policy goals are
usually stated openly, and commonly covert actions are used to support those foreign
policy goals. There are times when the stated foreign policy of the nation is undermined by
covert actions, however, the Iran-Contra affair being the most recent example.
As long as there are clear operational goals it is easy to measure success or failure.
Usually covert actions can be narrowed down to one single goal. Often it is to increase the
effectiveness of guerrillas merely to make things more expensive for the Soviet Union.
Possibly it is to overthrow the current government of a nation and install a friendlier new
government. If the single goal is achieved then operationally it can be deemed a success
even if several other factors point to failure as with the Kurds in Iraq in the mid seventies.
Unfortunately for the CIA, operational success isn't equivalent to a successful covert
action.
Foreign policy goals are more difficult to define since there can be some confusion
in exactly what U.S. foreign policy is at any given time. Policies such as the Monroe
Doctrine are relatively straightforward. Still the Carter administration claimed to be
following a human rights based foreign policy while often remaining allies with major
human rights violators. Policy is often left undefined in some areas merely so foreign
nations can't be sure where the U.S. stands and thus have to be very wary about actual
U.S. interests. Recent policies in Bosnia-Hersogavina point to an undefined U.S. foreign
policy.

Assigning numbers to the attainment of expressed foreign policy or operational
goals is a rather straightforward task. Obviously an operation which meets its foreign
policy objectives would receive a +7. An operation just short of ultimate success might
score a +6. In the case of election interference suppose the U.S. is supporting a certain
party in a foreign nation's election. Within that party the U.S. is hoping to install the party
leader as President. Now say that the U.S. succeeds in helping the party to win the
election, but before the favored party leader can be inaugurated he has a heart attack and
dies. His successor is not as favorable towards the United States, but still basically
supports U.S. goals in the country. In this situation a score of +6 or +5 would be assigned
depending on how favorable the new party leader and president towards U.S. wishes. An
operation which partially achieves its foreign policy goals would score lower possibly +2
or +1. Say the U.S. wishes to defeat a certain party and their are two competing parties:
Party A and Party B. The U.S. may support one of the competing parties to the exclusion
of the other say Party A, but Party B actually wins the election. At least the offensive party
is out of the picture, but actual U.S. goals were to install a specific competing party. Party
B is not the perfect answer, but they certainly are better than the original ruling party. A
failure or negative score would be assigned for failing to meet foreign policy goals. One
dictator might be defeated, only to be replaced by a slightly more benign new dictator.
Such a situation would receive a -5 or -6 score. A -7 would be assigned to absolute
failures where no amount of foreign policy goals ate reached, the Bay of Pigs being a good
example.
Operational goals score by a similar standard. A +6 operation would be one in
which very little went wrong. The election interference campaign run in Italy in 1948
would be one example of a near flawless operation which achieved its goals. For a less
successful undertaking one might look at the support for the Kurds in Iraq in the mid
1970s. The CIA was supposed to aid the Kurds in their rebellion. Because of political
reasons the funding ended, but it was generally a rather successful venture from an

operational standpoint earning a +5 or possibly +4. Other operations which only partially
succeed in their goals would score in the +1 to -1 range. One possibility would be an
election project in which rumors of CIA involvement leak out to the general population.
Because of this and possibly other factors the CIA supported faction loses the election.
This example might score a -1 since the operation failed, but the failure may have only
partially been due to mistakes made by the CIA. An operation scoring a -5 might be an ill
trained paramilitary force which despite causing a lot of destruction never actually wrests
control of the country away from the government. A total failure, a -6, would denote an
operation such as an election where CIA funding of an opposition party was exposed
because of sloppy work and the opposition party goes on to lose badly while the
government becomes even more shrill in its anti-American rhetoric.
Taken together operational and foreign policy goals make up the two largest factors
in deciding the success or failure of a given operation. If the CIA manages to meet its
operational and foreign policy goals, very often the operation will be a success in spite of
negative scores for excessive spending or relative little secrecy. Without successfully
meeting either operational or foreign policy goals the covert action is generally accessed as
a failure by the government and the CIA.

Time Frames

The question of time is essential to deciding issues of success or failure. In the
short term the immediate goals of an operation can quickly define success or failure. In the
example of a coup d'etat, the target is effectively removed or the attempt fails. Success
here is a simple definition based on the status of the target. The problems come later with
defining success.
At even a slightly later date, a coup may generate unwanted effects. It takes a
sophisticated effort of planning to pull off a successful coup. "Assassination, in short, is

no work for amateurs."^ Perhaps the rebellious faction kills the head of state in the coup
attempt and the country is plunged into chaos and violence instead of the hoped for effect of
a stabilized nation with a friendlier set of leaders.
At an even later date even if a new leader, more to the liking of the U.S.
government, comes to power perhaps he proceeds upon a course of terror and subjugation
which alienates large sectors of the population and negatively affects world opinion.
Certainly the initial situation of a successful coup is becoming more difficult to assign as a
success.
Now suppose that after many years of brutal rule the U.S. installed leader is finally
overthrown. Because the population is well aware of the U.S. government's role in
assassinating a former leader, there is a justifiable hatred for the U.S. The newly formed
government is hostile to the U.S. government and its interests. The successful coup of so
many years ago has to be reexamined in a different light. Indeed the Iranian example
follows this model pretty thoroughly. "The CIA-installed shah of Iran was ultimately
overthrown in a revolution that gave rise to the extremely anti-U.S. Islamic fundamentalist
regime headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini,..., suggesting that perhaps the United States
would have been better off (or at least no worse off) siding with the country's democratic,
albeit leftist, regime.

In the long term even an extremely successful operation can

become a serious error. Thus covert operations cannot be examined simply from an initial
time frame, but must take future events into account. The difficulty also lies, however,
with asserting too much historical importance to a single covert action which may or may
not have a significant effect on the future course of a single nation.
Examining covert operations in a time frame is not a new idea. Loch Johnson states
that ideally "one would also like to know before judging the appropriateness of a covert
operation what its effects will be on the future of the target nation, its people, and their
relationship toward the perpetrator of the covert operation."^ Some like B. Hugh Tovar
even argue that some successful operations look like failures taken in a long term context:

Guatemala in 1954 was operationally successful, an example of what might be called brash
technical virtuosity. But was the game worth the candle? We played into the endemic pattern of
Latin American history, military ouster of objectionable civilian governments. Our success was
short-lived. It is difficult not to wonder if the planners had read the history of the region before
plunging in ?

Seeing into the future may be an impossible task for planners, but the option of hindsight
makes evaluation over a period of time much easier to accomplish.
For the cases that will be examined, both of which took place almost entirely in the
1980s, a less then ideal time frame will be used. The examination of the cases will use
three relatively distinct time frames. There will be a short, medium, and long term time
frame as follows:
Short: less than 1 year
Medium: between 1 and 5 years
Long: more than 5 years

Time is measured here from the end of an operation until the present. If the cases had
occurred further back in time it would offer a longer look at the effects of the operation.
Operations from the "Golden Age" of the Agency such as Guatemala and Iran offer a
proper long perspective. Still when examining more current cases there is little one can do.
As for assigning values, the task is relatively simple. A +5 would denote an
operation that had no ill effects far after the operation. Italy makes a pretty good example
of such an operation though some would argue the interference in the 1948 elections have
led to some of the instability of Italy's many governments since the operation. A +2
operation might be one that had some ill effects afterwards such as the creation of a proxy
army which takes over a country and then in later years becomes belligerent towards an
adjoining U.S. ally. A score of zero would denote a country where the population is
generally given to anti-U.S. sentiments by the revelation of the CIA's interference in their
country either successfully or unsuccessfully. A score of -2 is exemplified by Guatemala.
After a successful operation there in 1954 the country has lived through a military
dictatorship ever since. While this has not been directly harmful to the United States it has
raised questions about the original adventure and its worth. Surely even under a slightly

leftist elected leader Guatemala would be a much better nation today. A score of -5 would
denote a country that had collapsed after a CIA operation. That country would then have
become a dire U.S. enemy launching terrorist attacks or selling dangerous weapons or even
pursuing nuclear weapons. At this point Iran would now score a -5 for the long term
effects caused by installing the shah. In these cases the worth of even a successful CIA
operation becomes questionable over the long run. Short term gain can often be reversed
by negative long term effects.

"Covert" Operations

Defining success based on whether an operation maintained its secrecy is quite
simple. Either the action went on without knowledge of the U.S. role or the operation was
exposed to the world. Seemingly this is a simple definition of success, but ascertaining the
relative secrecy of any covert action, as defined earlier, can be difficult.
Large scale operations are always going to operate above ground. Paramilitary
actions cannot be hidden, like covert intelligence gathering. Obviously the target is going
to know that someone is pursuing a violent course of action. Thus covert actions are not
truly secret. What is supposed to stay secret in CIA operations is the role of the U.S.
government in the operation. The citizens of a nation are not to know that the CIA heavily
funded the campaign of the winning party. Such a revelation would lead to an extreme lack
of confidence in the government and completely wipe out the operational goals.
Some operations require less secrecy especially when the intent is to educate the
target. In Afghanistan there was no question that the Soviet Union knew that the U.S. was
funding the Mujahideen. It was simply an educational exercise to inform the Soviets that
the U.S. was willing to help contest their invasion. The problem is obvious. If the
primary intent is to educate the target then the operation should not be conducted covertly.
Without the need for secrecy there is no need to have the CIA conducting these operations

since they were never meant to pull off open interventions. If there is little to hide then
why can't the operation be done above ground, overtly? John Stockwell assumes a cynical
answer to this question when speaking of the "secret" bombing of Cambodia:
The Cambodian people knew they were being bombed. Unfortunately, there was nothing on the
face of the earth that the Cambodian people cold do to stop the bombing. However, the people of
the United States could stop the bombing or at least raise an effective protest of it. Hence it was
vital to President Nixon that the bombing remain secret here at home.8

Obviously keeping tilings secret can be quite important if the action involves tactics which
would be abhorrent to a significant part of the U.S. population. This is exactly how the
CIA is sometimes drawn into operations which by all rights should be conducted overtly
with a stated U.S. role and policy.
Covertness is also ranked as a factor from 44 to -4. A 44 operation is simply never
revealed. This could include operations such as the 1948 Italian elections. A 43 operation
is one that stays almost completely secret Guatemala is an example of this level of secrecy
where the operation was never revealed until afterwards and only hinted at in a few
accounts. It was only many years afterwards that the Guatemala operation was ever widely
revealed. A score of zero would be assigned to an operation that was partially revealed
with little actual negative effects. An operation of this type would meet basic U.S.
standards and would not be considered out of the ordinary realm of allowable foreign
policy options. A score of -2 would be assigned to an operation which was not kept secret
on any large scale. Everything but the basic details of the operations leaks. The Bay of
Pigs would score a -2 as the operation was generally known to Cuba before it took place as
well as many citizens of Miami. A -4 would be assigned to an operation that was
completely exposed including unfortunate and embarrassing details. Since secrecy is
essential to any covert action, negative scores are usually indicative of failed operations
although some operations may be partially revealed and still manage to be successful.
Keeping an operation hidden or at least plausibly deniable is essential.
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Meeting American Standards

Democratic principles tend to be invoked when intervening in the affairs of other
nations. Often it is declared as an attempt to bring democracy and freedom to a nation. The
principle is no different in covert operations, it is simply not a publicly announced reason
for intervening. "Americans tend to construe their blessings as a special virtue in
themselves that makes them unlike others. "9 Should a covert action become exposed much
of the justification often centers around how it was in the interests of democracy. Often
arguments are made that the dirty tactics involved are worth the ends. As well it is often
stated that Americans hate war. There is an aversion to violence itself which stems from
the liberal ideals of Christianity and the Enlightenment.

Thus any resort to warfare, even

covert warfare, must be justified in terms of high idealistic purposes. Seemingly then an
acceptable covert action must at least live up to high standards of morality and
righteousness even if never exposed.
Still there are strong critics even within the U.S. of such democratic ideals in
interventions. Michael McClintock argues that using tactics like assassination violates any
claims of bringing democracy to a nation. He refers to the discussion of whether the ends
are worth the means as an "exercise in quantum ethics" and that "the argument epitomizes
the Cold Warriors' blind faith that the just cause of America suffices to purify virtually any
act of outrage carried out in its name."* * Other critics such as Noam Chomsky are also
critical of American attempts to whitewash interventions and blame the American media for
perpetuating the myth of an always virtuous United States:
With appropriate interpretations, then, we can rest content that the United States and its clients
defend democracy, social reform, and self-determination against Communists, terrorists, and violent
elements of all kinds. It is the responsibility of the media to laud the "democrats" and demonize
the official enemy: the Sandinistas, the PLO, or whoever gets in the way. On occasion this
requires some fancy footwork, but the challenge has generally been successfully met.1^

Thus the entire idea that the United States is intervening according to American principles is
not universally accepted. Still there is an assumption even if it is merely propaganda that

U.S. covert actions take place in order to advance American ideals such as democratic
pluralism, free speech, and greater freedom for the general population of a target nation.
Generally in order to measure such a nebulous thing as democratic standards one
can look to the national government. The government should be advancing towards some
more benign form after a successful covert action. Even if this means merely installing a
less brutal dictator at least it can be justified as an improvement. Simple things such as jury
trials and the rights of women and minority ethnic groups in a society also point out
whether a nation is advancing towards U.S. ideals. This also overlaps with the later
criteria for whether the target nation has advanced the welfare of the general population.
Scoring for democratic standards is not a matter of great difficulty. A hypothetical
operation scoring a +3 might involve support of a rebellious majority. The elected
government has been supplanted by a vicious coup. With CIA aid the rebels are able to get
rid of the coup leaders and reinstate democracy holding elections soon after. Such an
operation if conducted with a minimum of violence would certainly meet democratic
standards as well as the spirit of international law. A +1 operation could also involve
supporting a rebellious democratic faction, but involve a large deal of bloodshed to
accomplish its goals including many innocent civilians. A -1 operation would involve
support of rival parties to the communist party in Italy in 1948. While not completely
defensible in the context of the Cold War it was an understandable operation. A -3
operation would involve supporting a corrupt and cruel group of rebels attempting to
overthrow a democratic government. Guatemala is a classic example of a -3. While it is
not essential for an operation to score well on democratic standards, negative scores can
have multiplying effects especially if the operation is conducted in a less than secret
manner.
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Bang for the Buck

Spending in the CIA is not a penny pinching affair even today with the calls for
cutbacks in defense spending and intelligence. Some missions were well noted for their
cheapness especially versus military intervention. The sponsorship of a coup in Iran took
"a team of five Agency officers, equipped with a one-million-dollar slush fund in fivehundred-rial ($7.50) notes, organized the coup from a Tehran basement, according to CIA
m ythology."^ Such an operation was obviously a great bargain for installing a new
government with very close relations to the U.S.

Table 2 Covert Action Spending Since 198014
Afghanistan
Angola
Cambodia
Nicaragua
Others, est.

3,420,000,000
240,000,000
85,000,000
54 6,000,000
5,200,000,000

Obviously any covert action which fails is a waste of expenditure, at first glance.
Still, certain operations such as the support of the Kurds in the mid 1970s have as their
goal a temporary rebellion brought about to bring one side around. As soon as the shah
"reached a satisfactory understanding with the Iraqi with the Iraqis, the CIA was called off
and it abruptly abandoned the Kurds, leaving them helpless, unable to defend themselves
against bloody reprisals from the Iraqi

a r m y ."

15 Henry Kissinger was reported to have

said that "one must not confuse the intelligence business with missionary work." 16 Other
missions are also used as bargaining chips and to increase costs for aggressor nations.
Missions such as these cannot be considered failures automatically since they do not set out
to achieve some form of victory. Still missions which fail can be judged to have been
worth the risk.

Failures such as the Bay of Pigs, which contained many flawed

assumptions in the planning stages and a severe underestimation of Castro and his

popularity, were simply a waste of funds. However, well planned covert actions can fail
as well.
Failure of a covert action that was well planned and executed cannot be defined
simply as an inefficient use of funds. There is necessarily some risk of failure in any
covert action, similar to the risk inherent in the intelligence side of the Agency in predicting
future events. As long as the extent of the risk is known spending funds on what may be a
botched operation is not irrational.
Finally, there can be inefficient use of funds even on successful covert actions.
There is always the possibility that an operation could have been run cheaper. Still the real
question is often how much of the operations budget ended up simply being pocketed by
the local military leaders instead of being used to pursue a coup d'dtat or to fight guerrillas.
Efficient spending takes place across a small scale from +2 to -2. A +2 operation
would be conducted very cheaply with large results. Iran is one example. A +1 operation
is generally conducted with very little corruption and a reasonable amount of spending
given the objectives. A -1 operation is one in which there is some substantial amount of
fraud or a huge expenditure considering the desired results. The CIA campaign to keep
Allende from power in Chile in 1958 and 1964 involved a huge amount of spending given
the economy of Chile simply to keep Allende out of power. This campaign would have
scored a -1 for efficient expenditures. A score of -2 involves widespread corruption.

P ersp ectives

There is an obvious bias when examining CIA operations to simply consider the
perspective of the U.S., specifically the U.S. government. It is easier to examine CIA
operations and their success or failure as a matter of U.S. policy. More difficult is looking
as well at the perspective of other nations targeted by CIA operations.

Do covert actions help to advance the interests of target nations? Obviously the
interference by the U.S. is rarely welcomed and often is a violation of national sovereignty
and often international law. And when talking about a target nation, one whose politics are
being intimately affected, is it correct to consider the effect on the country's population as a
whole, or merely on the elites?
Much of traditional realist theory would focus on its effects on the elite of the
country. Traditionally it has been much easier to deal with the relatively few powerful elite
and rulers of a given country. U.S. foreign policy does not often focus on the plight of the
masses in a country unless there are grave humanitarian concerns and often even these are
overlooked as in cases like East T im or.^ Since the U.S. perspective is covered largely
already by foreign policy goals and operational goals, a separate factor is needed for the
target nation.
The easiest way of accomplishing this is looking at several aggregate figures as well
as some qualitative factors. Since most of the target nations are developing nations there
may already exist an air of contempt for human rights. In at least some cases of
intervention the newly installed rulers of a country literally turned the country into a blood
bath in order to quell any hint of dissent. Of secondary importance beyond simple security
is the need for economic goods, shelter and sustenance. Has the covert action improved
the lot of the general citizen or has it widened the gap between rich and poor?
A short list of these factors can be prepared in order to decide whether the welfare
of the nation has been served by a particular covert action. These factors would include:
1.
2.
3.
4.

GNP
Per capita income
Basic level of political violence and respect for human rights
Attainment of democratic values and form of government

Obviously these various factors can be expanded on in some cases. A respect for human
rights can include freedom from torture, a right to dissent, a lack of disappearances, lack of
discrimination by sex, and freedom of religion. Factors like GNP are self explanatory and
simple enough to calculate. It is assumed that simple economic development is an

improvement for the body of citizens and that what are often labeled as "Western" values
are upheld as a standard. Some Third World Scholars argue that imposing even basic
human rights may be an example of cultural imperialism though "some features of
traditional life deserve to go, because they conflict with justice and equity: the low status of
women everywhere and of untouchables in India and so on." 18 Still by combining
economic improvement with political and social rights a generalized conclusion can be
drawn on whether the lot of the masses has improved.
The benefits accrued to the population are taken to be the least important of the
criteria. They range from only +1 to -1. A +1 operation would be an operation which
succeeds in substantially improving the lot of the common person within the country. A +1
operation might involve the overthrow of an unpopular dictator and the establishment of a
democracy with a new respect for human rights. An operation scoring zero would involve
a generally unchanged situation for the target population, possibly the trading of one
dictator for another. A -1 operation is exemplified by CIA involvement in Zaire. The CIA
helped to oust Patrice* Lumumba in 1960. Lumumba was a popular elected leader.
Installed in his place was General Joseph Mobutu. Even today 40% of the national revenue
goes into Mobutu's pockets while the average Zairian makes $190 a year.19

Final Notes

Essentially this study is a mere beginning at examining the relative success or
failure of covert actions over the years. The analysis of the case studies will provide some
hint at the proper course of reform for the CIA. If covert actions have been on the whole
successful affairs then there is little need to make major changes in the area of covert
actions. If covert actions turn out to be more of a mixed bag of successes and failures then
there is at least some need to look at the future usefulness of covert actions. Ending covert
actions all together may be warranted if most operations turn out to be failures.

There is an assumption that the effects of a given covert action have large scale
effects. These effects can also be discerned as largely being a product of a single covert
action. Such an assumption is difficult to defend. The course of a given foreign nation
may have been very similar even without the intervention of the CIA. In some cases the
nation may have been much worse off even if the covert action is considered a failure.
Though it seems unlikely, maybe the course of Chile's history would have been worse
without the large scale CIA interference to defeat Allende for in its first week Pinochet's
regime "closed the country to the outside world for a week, while the tanks rolled and the
soldiers broke down doors; while the stadiums rang with the sounds of execution and the
bodies piled up along the streets and floated in the river; the torture centers opened for
business,..., and the poor returned to their natural

s ta te .

"20 Possibly the country could

have collapsed into an even bloodier civil war without CIA interference, though it is
difficult to imagine given the brutal nature of Pinochet's rule. Arguing that CIA operations
have little effect lends credence to the view that covert actions are an outmoded tool.
Factors like economic productivity may be only marginally related to CIA interventions, the
country arriving at its present state with or without CIA assistance. Still it seems that if
CIA operations had little real effect they would simply be abandoned as a way of
conducting foreign policy.
The U.S. perspective being the most important is an assumption as well. Since the
CIA is an American institution, the bias is not hard to understand. Also viewing operations
from a foreign perspective would clearly be difficult since almost no endeavor would be
approved. What remains to be seen is whether covert actions are still largely successful
and useful tool from a U.S. perspective.
Another issue is the lack of large numbers of case studies. A better study would
attempt to include all the covert actions that meet the definition from 1947 to the present A
comprehensive study of CIA operations would include all of the major operations from its
inception, at least the ones that have been made public or that can be inferred from reliable

evidence. This would include quite a few operations in Italy, Chile, Cuba, Angola, Iran,
Guatemala, El Salvador, and many other foreign nations. Such a study would provide
more reliable results and allow for a great deal more comparison. Still it is not within the
scope of this study.
One final issue is the difficulty of using only one researcher to examine and
determine the results. It is hoped that this bias may be overcome by replication of this
study using the same scale and rating method in a number of other case studies. If other
researchers can use this same technique and replicate similar results then it will add greatly
to the reliability of the conclusions reached. Under better circumstances a panel of
researchers could be asked to rate the case studies. They would then compare the results to
determine how reliable this ranking method is. Much of the literature on CIA operations
examines individual operations and deems them successes or failures. The hope within this
study is to bring about a more rigorous standardized examination of covert actions. With
this method the goal of a common definition of success or failure in the covert action arena
can be reached.
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C hapter III

N icaragu a: Seven D eadly Sins or Seven Signs o f S u ccess1

The Contra program in Nicaragua was not the first U.S. military intervention in
Nicaragua. Indeed the leadership the United States opposed took its name from famous
Nicaraguan who fought the U.S. Marines in the 1920s, Augusto Sandino. The
overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship merely brought renewed attention to the region,
especially with the onset of the "Reagan revolution."
American interest in Nicaragua first began in 1855 when a U.S. citizen, one
William Walker, declared himself president of Nicaragua. As accounts go:
Liberals hired an American adventurer, William Walker, and his small mercenary army, to
fight on their side against the Conservatives. Walker, a physician and lawyer from Tennessee
who had earlier tried to conquer northern Mexico, landed on the Pacific Coast of Nicaragua
with fifty-eight men and quickly took control of the Nicaraguan army and the entire country.
He had himself elected president, made plans to institute slavery, and grabbed the railroadsteamship line that Cornelius Vanderbilt had built across Nicaragua to transport people from
one ocean to the other a route especially popular among people from the eastern United States
who were going to California.^

The Liberals and Conservatives were Nicaragua's main political factions. The only
major difference between the two factions "was their attitude toward the Roman
Catholic Church, with the Conservatives, in general, believing the Church should have
a lot of influence in government, and the Liberals thinking it ought to confine its interest
to the soul." Walker was merely a Yankee mercenary turned dictator and was later
executed in Honduras by a firing squad.
Under Conservative rule Nicaragua remained in relative peace until 1893 when
a Liberal general, Jose Santos Zelaya, came to power and enforced a rather brutish
dictatorship. According to some accounts the situation evolved into a series of "wars
between Conservative and Liberal generals that dragged on over two decades and
41

brought U.S. troops to Nicaragua five times—three times to protect U.S. citizens when
hostilities threatened, twice to shore up compromise coalition governments menaced by
rebellious party generals. "3 Others have questioned the U.S. role seeing "the country
under US military occupation (1912-1933 apart from one year), leading to the murder
of the nationalist leader Sandino and the establishment of the Somoza dictatorship after
a brutal counterinsurgency campaign. "4 Obviously, enlightened or not, the presence of
U.S. Marines helped to create Nicaragua's revolutionary folk hero, Augusto Sandino.
Sandino, the nationalist who inspired the term Sandinista, fought a successful
guerrilla war against U.S. Marines occupying the country from 1927-1933. He fought
a long series of skirmishes with the Marines and was the unfortunate recipient of "the
first organized dive-bombing attack in history"^ on July 16, 1927. Still Sandino
managed to live to see the U.S. Marines pull out in 1933. One year later he was
executed by a National Guard firing squad under the orders of Anastasio Somoza
Garcia. As the years passed the legend of Sandino grew in a country with few heroes
and eventually the Sandinistas claimed his memory as their own.
The Somoza regime began soon after Sandino's death, the overthrow of the
elected president a mere formality. Somoza merely had the National Guard surround
the palace and forced the president to resign. Somoza then held an election and "when
the ballots were counted Somozaism had won the first of many landslide electoral
victories—107,000 votes for, 169 against. "6 Putting a positive spin on the rule of the
Somozas, Glenn Garvin argues that "while the Somozas could be brutal, they were not
significantly worse than the many Nicaraguan presidents who had enforced their rule
with party armies.

Others have described the rule of the Somozas as "one of the

most repressive and corrupt in the Americas.

Though the Somozas were generally

regarded as dictators, they were dictators friendly to U.S. interests, "our son of a
bitch," as FDR would claim.9

Anastasio Somoza Garcia was killed by a poet turned assassin in 1956. His
son Luis took over and ran the country stepping down after only one term to be
replaced by Rene Schick, a Somoza puppet, until 1967. Anastasio Somoza Debayle, or
Tachito, ran for president despite the best advice of his brother Luis who advocated a
more liberal form of dictatorship at least in appearances. Another Somoza as president
would damage Nicaragua's international stature. Tachito proved this quite early in the
election campaign by setting the National Guard upon supporters of the opposition
candidate. As the crowd marched towards the National Palace, "the Guardia opened
fire, killing at least forty marchers and wounding more than one hundred others.
Obviously domestic opposition to the rule of the Somozas existed. One
disaffected group which would later come to prominence was the FSLN, the Sandinista
Front. It was formed originally by three leftist student leaders: Carlos Fonseca, Tomas
Borge, and Silvio Mayorga. All three were influenced by "Marxism-Leninism, but
they did not spell it out in their early plans."^ The revolution in Cuba inspired them to
think that a guerrilla movement might be possible in Nicaragua. Still the FSLN
"repeatedly met with failure in its military

o p e r a tio n s ." ^

Indeed after the first two

military campaigns in 1963 and 1967, "the few remaining guerrillas retreated so deeply
into the jungle that, for all practical purposes, they ceased to exist" ^ They also mixed
in the nationalism of Sandino, Fonseca in particular insisting that the group name itself
after Sandino. They would finally become an important resistance group in December
of 1974.
On December 18,1974 a Sandinista squad burst into a Christmas party hosted
by Jose Maria Castillo and took over forty important guests hostage including
Somoza's brother in law. Somoza was forced to negotiate with the guerrillas—a
prospect that was not altogether pleasant for him:
I asked the Federal Reserve Board for five million dollars because I was not certain what the
final negotiated figure would be. As it turned out, we agreed on one million dollars, so we
had money to spare. The thought of paying that amount of money to Communist-trained
terrorists, who had kidnapped and killed, caused me to suffer mental agony. But what was I to

do? There was no way I could place a dollar value on the lives of people involved. It had to
be done. ^

The 1974 raid brought international attention to the Sandinistas and their cause, at a
point when "to most Nicaraguans, the Sandinista Front was presumed to be dead or
d y in g ." ^ 5

Though it was a spectacular tactical success it brought on a crisis within the

leadership of the FSLN. The FSLN would separate into three distinct factions: one
emphasizing a very prolonged war in which the consciousness of the people had to be
raised, one pushing for a prolonged peasant war, and the 'terceristas' or third-way who
hoped to "reach out to non-Marxists in the hope of producing a quick victory through
mass insurrection." 16
After the 1974 raid Somoza quickly pressed the National Guard into service
leading to widespread massacres including two mass executions totaling eighty-six
civilians within just a few weeks. 17 This level of repression eventually led to criticism
from the United States during the Carter administration. While Carter was not willing
to completely abandon Somoza on the basis of human rights, his administration did
seek to convince Somoza that he had to clean up his image or lose military assistance
from the United States. To Somoza the Carter administration's stress on human rights
was "a tool of destruction" 18 to be used on Nicaragua. Meanwhile Somoza, especially
after the corruption surrounding the 1972 Managua earthquake, had begun to lose
support from even the business sectors.
On January 10,1978, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro was assassinated. He had been
the head of La Prensa, the only tolerated opposition to Somoza. A harsh critic of the
regime he quickly became a martyr. His assassination brought the anti-Somoza forces
together, business and labor leaders had already been meeting with Somoza in an effort
to convince him to open up and reform the government. Soon after the murder of
Chamorro, they began calling on him to resign. At the same time the Sandinistas
heated up their armed resistance. Commander Zero, Eden Pastora, led a raid on the
National Palace galvanizing support, though Pastora would later turn up as a Contra

commander. Business and labor leaders were "sparked into action, declaring a general
strike the day after the phenomenally successful National Palace occupation ended." 19
Somoza's prospects were dim.
Stubborn till the end, Somoza refused to step aside and instead "tried to shoot
his way to peace," sending the National Guard to lay "siege to the rebellious cities,
cutting off food and utilities, and bombing and strafing by

a ir.

"20 The Guard would

then enter the smoking cities and proceed to "clean-up" which often meant killing any
male over 14. Despite these displays of brutality the Carter administration stuck by
Somoza longer than expected. Essentially the Carter administration tried to get Somoza
to step down to be replaced by an associate who was not related to the Somoza family.
Failing that, the Carter administration hoped to install a new moderate government
without Sandinista dominance and most importantly to keep the National Guard largely
intact. This was a policy of Somocismo without Somoza.
As the Sandinistas launched their final offensive on May 29, 1979 things began
to look especially bad for Somoza The United States was willing to try one last time to
stave off a total Sandinista victory. Somoza finally agreed to step down now that the
Sandinista victory was inevitable. An attempt was made to set up a new government by
ceding power to Francisco Urcuyo, head of Congress, as the new president. Urcuyo
would then negotiate a new government with moderate groups and the Sandinistas and
maintain the National Guard in part. The problem was Urcuyo "was prepared to serve
out Somoza's

te rm .

"21 On July 19 the Sandinistas took power. The CIA's covert

action would begin with Reagan's election. Eventually about $500 million would be
spent trying to oust the S a n d i n i s t a s . 22
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Foreign Policy Goals

Foreign policy goals should be relatively easy to determine. Governments
regularly announce foreign policy positions and take stances on international issues.
Presidents, prime ministers, and diplomats all comment on their country's foreign
policy.

The problem of course is that much of foreign policy is unofficial.

Governments often pursue policies antithetical to announced polices, an obvious U.S.
example was the Iran-Contra affair.
The case in Nicaragua was one of conflicting foreign policy goals. The initial
contention was that Nicaragua was supplying El Salvador's leftist guerrillas. This was
tied to a Soviet/Cuban imperialist conspiracy. Even more ridiculous claims of an actual
invasion force from Nicaragua were also put forward as proof of a new "domino"
theory in Central America proved by an increased military presence "nearly six times
the size of the old National

G u a rd .”2 3

Still all of this was to provide support for the

Reagan policy of creating and supporting the Contras.
In an early speech on foreign policy Reagan harshly criticized Nicaragua.
"Violence has been Nicaragua's most important export to the world," according to
Reagan. Still despite his heated rhetoric, Reagan made clear the United States limited
foreign policy goals:
Let us be clear as to the American attitude toward the government of Nicaragua. We do not
seek its overthrow. Our interest is to insure that it does not infect its neighbors through the
export of subversion and violence. Our purpose, in conformity with American and
international law, is to prevent the flow of arms to E l Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and
Costa Rica. We have attempted to have a dialogue with the government of Nicaragua but it
persists in its efforts to spread v i o l e n c e . ^

Thus the stated goal of American foreign policy was merely to stop the flow of
weapons to El Salvador. The other countries where Nicaragua was supposed to be
sending arms were relatively unimportant and mainly added for effect or in order to
bolster the notion that Nicaragua was supporting a widespread communist revolution in
Central America. Thus our stated goals were relatively simple in regard to Nicaragua,

basically being a side note to foreign policy regarding El Salvador. It would not seem
that the U.S. would be terribly interested in the Sandinistas as long as they were willing
to end military aid to El Salvador's guerrilla movement
Problems with this stated policy arose instantly. First, it was difficult to prove
that a large scale arms shipment program was underway. The arms supply connection
was relatively minor and was not the primary reason for the success of El Salvador’s
rebels. "Despite administration assertions of success in interdicting arms shipped by
land, and more recent charges that shipments are continuing, primarily by air, not a
single major shipment of arms has been captured in or near El Salvador since a Costa
Rican pilot was caught in

1 9 8 1 ."25

Some argued as well that the government was

applying a doctrine "invented by Lucas Alaman: blaming internal problems on foreign
governments."26 El Salvador had a problem with leftist guerrillas because of the brutal
rule of El Salvador's right wing elite, not because of Nicaragua.
The Administration's proof came largely from a series of captured documents
that were released to the public in the form of a White Paper, Communist Interference
in El Salvador. Whether the documents actually were captured from Salvadoran
guerrillas is a matter of some debate as Philip Agee, a famous or infamous former CIA
employee, maintains. According to Agee, "the Salvadorans may well have captured
some documents, but the most sensational in this White Paper are, I believe,
fabricated. "27 Agee was far from alone in his questioning of the White Paper released
by the State Department Within a month the White Paper was "exposed in the media
as a textbook case of U.S. government disinformation."28 Wall Street Journal
reporter, Jonathan Kwitny, broke the story on June 8th and later spelled out the case
against the White Paper in his book, Endless Enemies, stating that instead of proving
the case of a grand communist conspiracy against the government of El Salvador the
documents:
show the opposite: a disorganized, ragtag rebellion. Some of its participants have gone
around begging for help from the most likely sources and have been consistently stalled off

and sent home empty-handed, or with much less then they asked for. Not only do the
documents not prove the thesis, the thesis simply isn't tr u e .29

Still the White Paper served its purpose despite being exposed as a major exaggeration.
Along with Ronald Reagan's rhetoric, the White Paper helped win over
Congress and most Americans who "agreed that the Sandinista government was both
internally repressive and a threat to the

h e m is p h e re . " 3 0

As it was presented to the

public the purpose was merely to curb arm shipments to the Salvadoran rebels. The
real problem, especially frustrating to Reagan, was that he could never get widespread
support for his programs in Nicaragua. Indeed he was able to curry more favor with
Congress than the American public. Gallup polls taken up until 1989 on the handling of
Nicaragua showed consistently high disapproval ratings, never once reaching more
than a 35% approval rating.31
Another problem was that Administration officials and the Contras themselves
were hinting at the true aims of U.S. foreign policy in Nicaragua. While the United
States may have only intended the Contras "as an instrument of cheap containment, that
wouldn't prevent the Contras from pursuing their own

a g e n d a ." 3 2

Much of the

evidence points to the notion that the Contras shared their goals with their sponsors in
Washington. The Contra intervention was always in hopes of overthrowing the
Sandinistas.
At one point Congress through the Boland ammendment put its foot down on
aid to the Contras. The ammendment was supposed to stop any action by the CIA
which was aimed at destabilizing the government of Nicaragua. It specifically
authorized an end to all military aid to the Contras by either the CIA or the Department
of Defense.33 Congress did not forsee that a overzealous president would be willing to
simply shift the operation over to the National Security Council.
Still there remained an atmosphere of mystery among the United States foreign
policy goals regarding Nicaragua. Some scholars such as John Norton Moore have
tried to defend the Reagan Administration's claims. Moore claims that the notion that

the United States is trying to overthrow the government of Nicaragua is ludicrous.
According to Moore the U.S. desired good relations with the commandantes, President
Reagan's statements have been taken out of context, the Boland amendment says the
U.S. cannot seek to overthrow the government of Nicaragua, official policy statements
did not advocate overthrow of the Sandinistas, and the U.S. would have every right to
overthrow the Sandinistas, though the U.S. was not engaged in overthrowing the
S a n d in is ta s .3 4

None of these arguments is particularly convincing. The United States

through the Carter administration tried to keep the Sandinistas out of power right up
until the end. President Reagan's slips about the true purpose of the Contras to make
the Sandinistas "say uncle," were only too close to the truth. The Boland amendment
was not exactly a strict limit on Contra activities, and by May of 1 9 8 3 Chairman Boland
himself recognized that anyone "with any sense, would have to come to the conclusion
that the operation is illegal, (and) that the purpose and the mission of the operation was
to overthrow the government of N i c a r a g u a . "35 Official policy statements meant little,
"since "arms interdiction" was to be the official rationale for supporting the Contras,
administration spokesmen persisted to claim that Nicaragua was shipping vast amounts
of weaponry to El S a l v a d o r . " 3 6 Finally, in

1986,

the World Court disagreed with the

stated right of the U.S. to intervene in Nicaragua.
The Boland amendment would come about in direct response to this unspoken
foreign policy agenda. Essentially the Administration's unspoken policy was one of
overthrowing the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The sabotage operations of the
Contras, even early on, pointed to a policy of destabilizing the Nicaraguan state, not
merely preventing the shipping of arms to El Salvador. A policy of destabilization is
nothing new in U.S. foreign policy. Indeed many of the nations of Central and South
America have been subjected to U.S. power at various periods. Cuba, Mexico,
Guatemala, Chile, and others have all been targets of invasion, election interference,
and even assassination attempts.

Eventually even moderate members of Congress such as Speaker Jim Wright
realized exactly what the unstated U.S. goal was. Wright speaking on renewed Contra
funding in 1985 stated that "for the first time we're going to be saying that we are
accessories to overthrowing the government of

N ic a ra g u a . " 3 7

There was no longer

doubt of the real intentions of the United States in regards to the government of
Nicaragua. The U.S. intended to overthrow the government of Nicaragua by way of a
proxy army, economic warfare, and election financing. All of these techniques
involved the services of the Central Intelligence Agency.
As the actual foreign policy goals have been established little remains except to
see if the goal of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua was reached. On
February 26, 1990 Daniel Ortega peacefully conceded defeat to the U.S. supported
opposition, while "U.S. policy makers gloated over the r e s u l t s . "38 After a decade the
Sandinistas had finally been defeated by electoral means. The Contras had largely
faded from the scene no longer a significant military force without Congressional
funding. While the victory was long and costly in the long term U.S. foreign policy
goals were met. For this operation foreign policy goals can be assigned a +7. The
election of the Chamorro government was clearly a foreign policy victory.

Operational Success

It is difficult to state the actual operational goals in the CIA's involvement in
Nicaragua. Part of this difficulty stems from a foreign policy which was largely
secretive and unannounced. While many observers fully understood that the aim was
to overthrow the Sandinistas, officially that was never the policy. The operation also
suffered breaks in funding which led to a lack of continuity.
Since it can be assumed that the CIA operation was an attempt to overthrow the
government of Nicaragua, then their primary operational goal was to mold the Contras

into an effective guerrilla force capable of destabilizing the government. Similar
operations in Laos and Iraq had been less then successful with the Agency eventually
tarnished with the implication that they had cynically manipulated peasants and then
hung them out to dry. The bulk of CIA spending was directed towards supporting the
Contras, but there were other facets to the CIA program.
Unlike foreign policy goals the operational success of the intervention and
destabilization campaign was decidedly mixed.

The Contras were basically a

unadulterated failure. Despite large investments in training, equipping, and supplying
the Contras, the "years of United States assistance never produced an insurgency
capable of sustaining itself among the population in N

ic a ra g u a ." ^

The Contras were

little more than a well paid band of mercenaries "who routinely attack civilian
populations. Their forces kidnap, torture, and murder health workers, teachers, and
other government em p lo y e e s." ^ "Their inept guerrilla campaign serves chiefly to
discredit themselves and their American supporters."^ They were never the proxy
army of "freedom fighters" that Ronald Reagan had hoped for.
The Contras' military campaign never moved much beyond border raids. The
typical Contra incursion into Nicaragua involved crossing the border of Honduras and
launching small raids on villages possibly picking up recruits or forcibly taking them.
Their was little coordination of attacks even when large scale campagins were cooked
up by U.S. military advisors in Honduras. The Contra military campaign was highly
successful at causing terror among the population of northern Nicaragua, but it never
seriously threatened the population centers such as Managua in Central Nicaragua.
Their human rights record was deblorable. Indeed Congress set aside three
million dollars of a 100 million dollar aid package to the Contras in 1986 when it finally
renewed funding. The three million was specifically to train the Contras to respect
international norms of human rights. In an interview one Contra officer, who was
obviously in need of human rights training, was quite frank about what happened to

captured prisoners answering the interviewer's question on what would happen if one
did not wish to answer questions during an interrogation:
You would be beaten until you talked. Also, an interrogation is carried out intensively only
when it can be determined that the subject can give information of interest. No time is wasted
interrogating people who can't give any information. CDS members (Sandinista military), for
example, don't usually give any useful information. So they aren't interrogated. They're
eliminated right away. A real interrogation is useful only if one has captured a soldier in
battle. Then one can get from him information that's directly applicable.42

Reviewing the record of atrocities committed by the Contras, the Brody report issued in
1985 by Reed Brody concludes that "the preponderance of the evidence indicates that
the Contras are committing serious abuses against

c iv ilia n s .

"43 Brody's report met

with criticism from the Reagan administration, but was confirmed by the New York
Times, CBS News and Americas Watch. And human rights were not the only problem
with the Contras. They also had a corrupt leadership which was quite happy to take
U.S. money and less worried about winning a war. Finally, there are even some
allegations that the Contras were dealing in drugs to finance their c a u s e . 4 4
Corruption was well known in the Somoza regime, and it would remain under
his old National Guard in Honduras. Since the leadership of the Contras was
overwhelmingly former National Guard members the Contras would be run by a
corrupt leadership. Lower level Contra commanders attacked the leadership numerous
times over corruption. Often even basic foodstuffs would never make it to the troops in
the field. The leader of the FDN, a former National Guard member, Enrique
Bermudez, survived numerous attempts by lower level commanders to remove him.
Often Bermudez was no where to be found, "spending time in Tegucigalpa with his
lover and c h i l d . " 4 5 Bermudez was accused of corruption throughout his leadership of
the Contras, but with CIA support he stayed in power. At one point the CIA set up a
system of distributing funds through a central coordinator, Hugo Villagra, in order to
get weapons and food directly to troops. It ended two months later, and upon his
resignation Villagra maintained that there was "a lack of authentic leadership,
professionalism, and ethics in the majority of the military personnel who hold positions

in the upper echelons of the FDN [and] who have transformed this sacred cause into a
way to make a l i v i n g . " 4 6 By keeping the National Guard leadership the C I A kept intact
its rampant corruption.
R. Pardo-Maurer, a political officer with the Contras from 1986 to 1988 argues
that the real failing of the Contras was their leadership. The Contras were without
democratic traditions.

Washington tried to create a democratic force though

"assemblies, committees, secretariats came and went; declarations, charters, covenants
solemnly succeeded one

a n o th e r.

"47 The true problem resided in the leadership of the

Contras, the former National Guard.
d e m o c ra c y .

"They seemed to grudge, not embrace,

"48 With a well entrenched leadership unwilling to implement democratic

reforms the Contras would never be a viable alternate to the Sandinistas.
Another problem with the operation came from the mining of Nicaraguan
harbors. The problem here was that it wasn't carried out by the Contras, but by the
CIA and it amounted to little more than an act of war. It caused widespread outrage
among even Congressional supporters of the Contras such as Barry Gold water. It
helped to outrage even European allies of the United States. In short it was "one of the
most catastrophic covert actions in the history of U.S.

in t e llig e n c e .

"49 Mining the

harbors turned out to be a huge mistake. Eventually it would lead to a strong ruling
against U.S. interference in Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice.
Another error came with the discovery of a CIA manual for training the Contras
which advocated assassination. The manual written by a former Special Forces major
referred to neutralizing Sandinista officials in villages. It also referred to using
criminals and creating martyrs by provoking confrontations, but these sections were
edited out by Edgar Chamorro, propaganda chief for the FDN. The manual caused a
tremendous uproar because it implied that the CIA, quite illegally, was again engaged in
political assassinations, which had been specifically banned by executive order.

The cutoff of aid in May of 1984 was difficult for the CIA and the Contras. At
this point the CIA operation would for all purposes cease. Unfortunately Ronald
Reagan was not willing to take no as an answer from Congress and so he told his staff:
"We can't break the law, but within the law, we have to do whatever we can to help the
Contras

s u rv iv e .

"50 Despite his claims, the interim funding project for the Contras

would blow up into a terrible scandal involving Iran, arms trading, hostages, and
Swiss bank accounts.
The Contra part of the Iran-Contra affair was led by an NSC staffer, one
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North. North was completely behind the Contra cause.
While it is still unclear just how much authorization North had to support the Contras
there is little doubt the Reagan at least supported North's operation in general. North
helped by hitting up friendly allies for funding for the Contras. Of course there were
obvious implications that when Saudi Arabia donated a million dollars a month, later
doubled, to the Contra cause that they expected some consideration in return. North
also went looking for aid among private donors—primarily rich anti-communist
crusaders.
The Boland amendment never bothered North, and it obviously didn't stop his
supervisors McFarlane and Poindexter. He went about creating a resupplying
operation through Richard Secord whose interpretation of the Boland Amendment is
instructive:
The idea that Contra support was intended to be an illegal "end run" around the Boland
Amendments, and not something painstakingly conducted in compliance with them, was a
myth created later by the media and repeated so often that it eventually took on the color of
truth. In fact, the legislative history shows quite the opposite.31

Secord, North, McFarlane, Poindexter, and others were all eventually charged and
convicted of crimes in the Iran-Contra affair because they accepted such facile
explanations or later sought to defend such actions during the cover-up.52 The most
serious abuse of power in Iran-Contra was this attempt to create a private foreign policy

out of the reach of Congress. If Iran-Contra had succeeded or gone undiscovered
future Presidents who disagreed with Congress could simply make an end run around
the legislative branch.
The final aspects of Iran-Contra involved the crossing of two operations, a
terrible idea under almost any set of circumstances. Since Secord and Albert Hakim
had made some extra money off of arms sales in Iran they donated a part of it back to
the Contra resupply operation which they were also running. When Eugene Hasenfus
was captured by Sandinistas he spilled the beans on North and Secord's operation.53
Shortly thereafter the Iranian operation came to light and then the last damaging piece in
the puzzle, the diversion. The entire operation was eventually revealed in some detail
and the Reagan administration was mortally wounded although Bush and Reagan
managed to weather the storm without criminal charges by claiming ignorance. The
scandal hurt the CIA by involving the U.S. once again in secret operations that went
beyond the law, even if this time the CIA hadn't really been involved.
During all of this the CIA was largely relegated to the sidelines as required
without Congressional funding. Little of the blame for Iran-Contra can actually be
accessed as a CIA failure. Essentially Reagan used the National Security Council staff
to conduct an unregulated covert war without the aid of the CIA. William Casey, then
head of the CIA, was probably privy to the operation, but the CIA was not really
involved. McFarlane asserts that Casey "was searching for an alternative basis for
conducting covert operations in Central America," and that North and the NSC
provided an off-the-shelf Contra support operation, however illegal.54 The blame for
Iran-Contra rests with the Administration. The problem for the CIA with Iran-Contra
would come about over the long term.
Beyond support for the Contras the CIA intended to make the economy scream.
Many of the Contras' operations were explicitly aimed at causing economic damage that
would further weaken the Sandinistas. This was so important that the CIA would

involve its own personnel in mining harbors and attacking coastal towns, "a CIA
operation from start to f i n i s h . "55 Reagan's official policies dovetailed nicely with the
CIA's operational aims. In May of 1985 Reagan declared a full trade embargo with
Nicaragua though there was no "allied support for the e m

bargo.

"56 The embargo and

other actions, including pressure on the World Bank to end all loans to a struggling
Nicaragua, helped to make the internal situation in Nicaragua worse. In the end it also
helped to prove Washington's fears, pushing a military draft into effect to defend
against the Contras and forcing Ortega to woo the Soviet Union since they were "the
only outside source available to him for money and weapons to defend against the
Contra military

fo r c es.

"57 Still much of the economic program was above ground.

The CIA only specifically helped to damage the economy by supporting Contra
operations intended to destroy key economic targets since the Contras at no time could
actually wrest control from the Sandinistas by purely military means.
During the years of the CIA's operation up until 1990 possibly $100 million
was spent specifically on internal opposition to the Sandinistas. These opposition
groups included political opponents, religious leaders, and even La Prensa.
Nicaragua's most successful newspaper received "covert funding not only from the
Central Intelligence Agency, but also from the secret network coordinated by Lieutenant
Colonel Oliver North, the former National Security Council official and central figure in
the Iran-Contra s c a n d a l . "58 Domestic opponents of the Sandinistas were supported as
well, and the CIA helped set up the civilian cover for the Contras at times even enticing
former Sandinista supporters to serve on the Contra's political directorate. Indeed the
most popular domestic opponent of the Sandinistas, Managua Arturo Cruz, pulled out
of the 1984 election specifically to help invalidate the elections though he might have
made "a formidable o p p o n e n t . "59 Cruz had returned to Nicaragua to go "through the
motions of being named the presidential candidate of the CDN and then of entering into

discussions with the government on the terms of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , " * ® in order to pull out
and make the Sandinistas look bad, a decision he later regretted.61
Overall the operational goals were only met in 1990 when the Sandinistas were
forced out by the ballot box. Though the goal was finally met, the main thrust, the
Contras, were almost an absolute failure. Edward N. Luttwak, a chair at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, refers to the CIA's work in Nicaragua as
"disastrous operational incompetence."*® The elections were arrived at not so much
because of CIA pressure, but because of pressure from other Central American
countries especially Costa Rica. Indeed most of the money for candidates came from
the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), an open source. The NED provided
about $12.5 million to the opposition directly, or about $ 8 dollars a voter, more than
twice what George Bush spent per voter to get elected in 1988.*® And this in an
extremely poor Third World nation. As a whole the CIA operation in Nicaragua was a
failure.
Operationally all that remains is deciding how big a failure the Contras were.
An ill trained army commanded by corrupt National Guard members—the Contras were
a disaster. The CIA had to involve its own personnel in mining efforts and attacks on
coastal towns, a development that eventually hurt the whole operation. The Contras
never developed an effective political wing, and the final foreign policy came about
because of election influencing where the CIA and the Contras played only a marginal
role. All of this adds up to a nearly complete disaster in reaching operational goals
giving the Nicaragua operation a -5 for operational goals.

Long Term Success

In the short and medium term the CIA operation was a general success. The
Chamorro government upon winning instituted a Western style democracy. The

Sandinistas were defeated in an election generally conceded to be free and fair despite
heavy United States aid to the opposition candidates. Notions of privatization were
introduced immediately after Chamarro assumed office with dramatic effects. "In the
first six months of the new government the economy suffered a dramatic acceleration of
hyper inflationary tendencies. It reached an unprecedented average monthly inflation
rate of 89 percent for the first six m

o n th s .

"64 One year after Chamorro's election, 58%

of Nicaraguan citizens felt the UNO government had worsened the economic situation.
Aditionally, more than three-quarters of the population expressed displeasure at the
decline in health and educational s e r v i c e s . 6 5 Even early on there were problems.
In the medium term things were still going well for the United States, but cracks
were beginning to show in the earlier glowing victory. Under pressure from the United
States Nicaragua dropped its valid claim to war reparations stemming from the World
Court decision in

1 9 8 6 .6 6

Chamorro was under quite a bit of pressure to leave

Humberto Ortega, a Sandinista leader, as the head of the military. Some considered her
to be giving "away a victory that had cost Nicaragua a decade of war and twenty
thousand l i v e s . "67 In effect the Chamorro government was not as well received as the
United States had hoped.
In the longest term that can be effectively observed as of today, the final goal of
removing the Sandinistas from power was largely achieved.

A U.S. backed

government sits in power today. Still there are nagging problems in the long term with
the CIA's program of destabilization. As the new elections of 1996 approach there is
some question as to how the UNO will fare.
First, the Sandinistas are by no means defeated as a political force. Within the
Chamorro government they still wield much power and have a strong base in the
military. They also maintain widespread political support. Some have argued that
Nicaraguans were convinced to vote for the Chamorro government because it was the
only way to convince the U.S. to leave Nicaragua alone. Essentially "the Contras, with

U.S. approval and at U.S. direction, became an active part of the US-organized antiSandinista political

c a m p a ig n .

"68

William I. Robinson, an investigative journalist,

spelled out the simple equation:
Because the Contras support the UNO, and because the United States sponsors both the UNO
and the Contras, an electoral victory for the UNO will mean an end to the military war with
the Contras. The UNO, by virtue of its relation to the superpower waging war against
Nicaragua, will be able to achieve peace. A vote for the UNO is a vote for peace.®

Thus the Sandinistas may be able to return to power in the next few years with
substantial public support. The CIA itself seems to see some danger of communism in
Nicaragua. In its 1991 World Fact Book the Agency lists Nicaragua as containing
between 15,000 and 20,000 communists, though it does not list numbers of dedicated
capitalists, supporters of liberal democracy, or democratic socialists, groups that
probably have greater followings than c o m

m u n is m .

70

At least there is some indication that despite being defeated in the electoral realm
the Sandinistas are still a large popular force capable of returning to power sometime in
the future, most likely through perfectly legal electoral means. Only one year later
writing in the New Republic James LeMoyne states that "Chamorro is still simply
trying to maintain the imperfect peace that ended the open civil war. She has barely
begun the process of crafting a true democracy. "71 As well, the long term implications
of the operation are unknown. There are still a large number of former Contras in
Nicaragua and the country is in desperate economic straits.
The question also remains as to how the situation in Nicaragua would have
evolved without the massive intervention by the United States. Jim Wright, former
Speaker of the House, points out that a "negotiating process achieved what six years of
U.S.-financed militaiy intervention had failed to achieve. It brought peace and restored
d em ocracy.

"72 Others point out that the Contra intervention forced the Nicaraguan

government to more extreme measures which would have been unlikely without U.S.
interference.

In the long run Nicaragua is not likely to have posed any real threat to the U.S.
The only real threat was that of a successful demonstration. Nicaragua could lead by
example to the rest of Central America. Essentially the threat that is always cited is a
domino effect. If Nicaragua fell to socialists then El Salvador would be next and then
maybe Guatemala or Houndoras. The Sandinista victory proved that dictators in
Central America could be overcome by popular uprisings. Cuba had provided a similar
example in 1959, and remains to this day a bitterly denounced enemy of the United
States. Since the United States has consistently supported military backed regimes
such as the one now coming under fire in Guatemala, the threat of demonstration may
have been serious. Other attempts to oppose U.S. interests such as Panama and
Grenada met with armed force. A successful Nicaragua may have led to renewed fears
of uprisings in other U.S. friendly regimes. Obviously there was a fear that the
successful revolution in Nicaragua would carry over to El Salvador, a place where
"one learns that an open mouth can be used to make a specific point, can be stuffed
with something emblematic; stuffed, say, with a penis, or if the point has to do with a
land title, stuffed with some of the dirt in question," a place where body dumps "are a
kind of visitors' must-do, difficult but worth the

d e to u r .

"7 3 With or without the

intervention Nicaragua could pose little actual threat to the United States.
Finally, the whole intervention is likely to sustain anti-Yankee sentiment for
some time to come. Essentially whether one supported the Sandinistas or not, the
United States was heavily involved in violating Nicaragua's national sovereignty. It is
also hard for the Nicaraguan population to see this as an ahistorical aberration since
there is a long history of massive interference by the United States in Nicaragua.
Though it is impossible to predict the effect of anti-Yankee sentiment, it helped fuel
bitter enemies such as Iran and Cuba. Many observors believe that to this day Castro
remains in power mainly because of U.S. hostility to Cuba. Castro can always point to

the evil United States and how he stands up against it, a strategy that has maintained his
popularity in Cuba even now in a very difficult economic situation.
Since the long term effects are difficult to determine the operation is ranked as a
zero. There is considerable anti-Yankee sentiment in Nicaragua and the Sandinistas are
a powerful political force. Ranking will be easier after the results of the 1996 election
that may return the Sandinistas to power. If UNO or another party can retain power
then the long term effects may be slightly positive.

C overtness

The CIA operations against Nicaragua were never truly secret. While the Carter
administration's early funding of groups opposed to the Sandinistas may have remained
hidden, Reagan went out of his way to brag about the Contras. In Reagan's attempt to
win over domestic opinion he approved "the public use of classified imagery on a scale
unparalleled since the Cuban missile crisis, in a despairing attempt to try to prove the
administration's c a s e . "74 Even special missions such as the mining of harbors became
unearthed almost immediately.
The main thrust of the CIA's operation in Nicaragua, the Contras, was never
much of a secret. Nor was the United States' role in funding their operations. Indeed,
unlike previous large scale covert actions, the Administration engaged in debates with
Congress about funding the Contras. Previous proxy armies such as the Meo tribes in
Laos and anti-Castro Cubans had at least attempted to maintain some secrecy. Had the
CIA been able to hide U.S. connections to the Contras the myth of the "freedom
fighter" might have been more plausible. No one in the international community
including allies really questioned whether the U.S. was behind the Contras.
Some of the CIA program and funding was kept more secret. Aid to opposition
groups and organizations such as Nicaragua's largest paper, La Prensa, were largely

unacknowledged though there were significant rumors and allegations of CIA
involvement. As it turned out the allegations were quite true. John Spicer Nichols
reports in the Columbia Journalism Review on a year long investigation that "clearly
shows U.S. aid to La Prensa was an integral part of a campaign to help the Contras
overthrow the Sandinista g o v e r n m

e n t." ^

still even at the last minute reports emerged

about the CIA funding of the 1990 elections. The U.S. had agreed to no covert
funding of opposition candidates, but the CIA was secretly funding opposition
candidates in explicit violation of peace accords. While concrete proof was never
unearthed before the election the rumors turned out to be true. The CIA had run "a
covert operation largely hidden from Congress that paid about $600,000 to some 100
Miami-based Contra political leaders and organizers to return to

N ic a r a g u a ." ^

The

two intelligence committees weren’t fully informed of the program until after the
elections and Senate Chairman David Boren felt that "he had been had."77 At the very
least the CIA was able to keep much of the electoral and political interference from
public view, a situation that never existed for the Contras.
The failure to keep the Contras covert was a serious mistake. Even though
some of the election interference and aid to other groups were kept secret, rumors
persisted that the CIA was involved. Also since the Contras were the main thrust of the
operation their mistakes were especially costly. The United States simply could not
deny it was behind the Contras. Under covertness the operation scores a -3 saved from
a -4 only by the amount of undercover aid to Sandinista political opponents that went
undiscovered.

Democratic Standards

U.S. foreign policy typically suffers from an emphasis on promoting
"democracy." The mission in Nicaragua never met democratic standards, but that

would be hard to tell from Administration statements. The Contras were a force led
mostly by ex-Guardsmen that were used to terrorize the Nicaraguan population.
Elections were massively financed and influenced by the CIA including reports of
attempts to sabotage the respectability of 1984 elections by pulling out a high profile
candidate. International opinion was less then positive. Also since the U.S. role
wasn't hidden it is difficult to defend. Still a Democratic House did vote to continue
sending money to the Contras though ostensibly it was merely to stop aid flows to El
Salvador, a goal that was of little use to the Reagan administration.
One of the greatest contentions was that the Contras were "freedom f i g h t e r s " ^
who sought to restore democracy to Nicaragua. The Sandinistas were portrayed as a
totalitarian communist group seeking to establish a new Russia in Central America
"imposing rigid military rule and ousting the leaders of the other factions that had
fought with them in the r e v o l u t i o n . "79 Neither of these myths hold much weight.
The Contras were far from a principled group of revolutionaries hoping to turn
their country into a democratic nation. Instead they were largely holdovers from
Somoza’s National Guard, hated and despised by the majority of the population. The
September 15th Legion from which the FDN was formed was a gang of petty criminals
and mercenaries for hire. Their earliest exploits were "robberies, kidnappings, and
deathsquad

m u rd ers" ^ ®

in

Guatemala. While Reagan may have wanted to wrap the

Contras in the cloth of true revolutionaries, the Sandinistas actually pulled off a popular
revolution against Somoza.
Despite the rhetoric Nicaragua was not the totalitarian communist nation that
Reagan imagined. The Sandinistas did consolidate power in the ruling junta after the
revolution, but they were well supported by the population in general. Though an
election was not held until 1984 "most observers agree that the Sandinista party would
win any election held."81 Freedom of the press was retained although there were some
restraints put on the shrill opposition La Prensa which received funding from the CIA.

Indeed the CIA funding of the Contras precipitated the state of emergency which
brought about the most oppressive measures imposed by the Sandinistas. When the
U.S. government pointed out things such as censorship and the draft under the state of
emergency they failed to point out "that every government, no matter how democratic,
has employed extraordinary measures in wartime, including the United S

ta te s ." ^

The

Contras certainly helped to create these "totalitarian" aspects of the Sandinista
government. If the Sandinistas were truly as evil as they were portrayed they would
never have won the 1984 election, which was considered basically free and fair by the
international community, and they never would have peacefully stepped aside as they
did upon losing the 1990 elections.
The U.S. never followed democratic standards in the "secret" war against
Nicaragua. Indeed the U.S. was willing to violate international law to such an extent as
to mine Nicaraguan harbors. Once the case was filed against the U.S. in the World
Court, the U.S. simply announced that it was ignoring the World Court's jurisdiction
for two years, a move that clearly signaled U.S. guilt. In the name of fighting
communist revolution and its export the U.S. clearly ignored democratic standards,
massively interfering in the elections that were held.

This policy of fighting

communism at any cost including "dirty wars" had a long history, probably beginning
with the U.S. intervention in the Russian revolution or the 1948 Italian elections.
Nicaragua was merely a case of hypocrisy where the United States government claimed
to be fighting for democratic ideals while constantly violating them. The overt nature of
the operation merely adds to the true failure in Nicaragua. The operation scores a -3 for
its total failure in even partially meeting democratic standards.

65
Efficient Expenditure

As mentioned earlier there was a large measure of corruption among the FDN
leaders. Even non-Guard members got in on the act not the least being Eden Pastora, a
former Sandinista leader. Pastora never established a Southern Front despite his
championing by the CIA. All of the aid sent to Pastora made very little impact and with
an attempt on Pastora's life the Southern Front broke up. Despite Pastora's popularity
and authenticity as an opponent of Somoza, unlike the PON’s leadership of former
National Guard members, by 1984, "the CIA, once so proud of recruiting Pastora,
wanted nothing more to do with h i m . " 8 3 Members of the political directorate had their
hands in the cookie jar as well. Basically the Contra politicians were shuttled around
Congress in order to convince legislators of the need for Contra funding. Still these
politicians were amply rewarded for their services. Calero the most important member
of the directorate was not living off ideals. "Calero was wearing expensive suits,
jetting from speech to speech, hobnobbing with America's wealthiest conservatives.
Lawmakers could see what this "rebel leader" really was—a glad-handing
businessman. "84 Many of the Contras best paid members would end up moving to
Miami after the war.
From a standpoint of expenditures, the covert action in Nicaragua was relatively
cheap, certainly cheaper then actual U.S. military involvement. Still quite a lot of
money was spent in order to remove the Sandinistas. The bulk of this money was
spent on the Contras who were an utter failure. The final victory was partially from
exhaustion after facing the wrath of a superpower. And the Sandinistas were not
completely removed from the picture because they still wield substantial power in the
Chamorro government.
Largely overt election interference proved the final blow to the Sandinistas. A
large part of this interference was completely in the open through the National

Endowment for Democracy (NED). Indeed William I. Robinson argues that the NED
has effectively taken over the old role of the CIA in rigging elections. Nicaragua was
just the latest example which goes back to three earlier success stories in the
Philippines, Chile, and Panama:
In both the Philippines and Chile, the goal was to remove U.S. allies, brought to or
maintained in power by earlier U.S. interventions, whose continuation in office no longer
served U.S. interests. The U.S. effort in these two countries intersected with indigenous and
broadly based movements against dictatorial governments. In the case of Panama, the aim
was to legitimize an opposition created by the United States after the existing regime fell out
of favor with Washington and to build an international consensus in favor of military
aggression. In Nicaragua, the goal was to remove a designated e n e m y .85

If the CIA was not the key to the assumption of power by the UNO, then the
expenditure on the Contras was largely worthless. Still the implicit threat the Contras
posed was quite convincing to members of the Sandinista government. "Nicaragua
was worn down considerably as the result of w a r, "86 forcing the Sandinistas into
unpopular polices such as the universal draft
In the end the cost of the intervention, at least the CIA's part, appears to have
been wasted. Despite hundreds of millions of dollars in aid the Contras were never
capable of military victory. Much of the aid also went into the pockets of the corrupt
Contra leadership instead of the actual Contras in the field. Also much of the economic
pressure involved cutting off aid, enforcing a unilateral trade embargo, and pressuring
international agencies such as the World Bank to deny loans to Nicaragua. Finally, the
massive election interference was largely out in the open. While the corruption was
significant the foreign policy goals were met, and the Contras may have been part of the
reason for the electoral victory. Instead of rating the operation as totally inefficient
these mitigating factors give the operation a -2.

67
Benefit to Population

The Contra war was a tremendous strain on an economy already in shambles
from the end of Somoza's rule. While the country would probably not have recovered
until 1983, with the Contra war it simply continued to fall. The Sandinistas made
mistakes and productivity dropped off both because of Contra attacks and an overly
centralized planning system. Though inflation was running at 35,000 percent in 1988
the Sandinistas "were able to bring inflation under control without popular upheavals
like those that rocked other Latin American s t a t e s . ' ' ^ ? This was quite a feat considering
the poverty of the country.
Still the guide to measure by is how the economy did after the Sandinista defeat
and whether the population benefited. According to CIA figures GDP started at 1.7
billion in 1989 and fell to 1.6 billion by 1991 a year after the Chamorro government
was in power. Per capita income showed the same precipitous decline in 1991 falling
from $470 per capita to $425 per c a p i t a . ^ in

1992

GDP grew returning to 1.7 billion,

but per capita income remained low at $425 per capita.89 This coupled with a decline in
spending on education and health shows a net loss for the people under Chamorro.
Still this must be tempered with the difficulty of overcoming a decade of open warfare.
At least under the Chamorro government the United States was willing to end its
support for the Contras.
As far as the basic level of political violence, it has severely tailed off with the
end of the Contra war and the election of the Chamorro government. Still there are
some political killings both of former Contras and Sandinistas.

Amnesty

International's 1993 report also included some cases of abuse by the police including
beatings of protesters .90 If one was to establish a baseline with the onset of operations
against Nicaragua there would be some violations of human rights, but generally a
pretty good record for a poor country. The general consensus is that most of the

abuses by the Sandinistas took place in the first few months of the new government.
Hundreds of ex-National Guard members were the main victims. Most of the political
violence was caused later by the Contras which means the United States was truly
fostering much of the violence and lack of human rights in the country. Thus the lifting
of the United States campaign of violence obviously improved human rights, since the
Contras themselves were the main violators.
Nicaragua at this stage of its development can be considered a democratic
nation. Though there are still flaws in Nicaragua's institutions, they have been able to
hold two elections in a row judged free and fair by the international community.
Opposition members are not outlawed or killed. By turning over power the Sandinistas
helped to maintain the fragile democracy that had been threatened during the Contra
war. The military has been maintained as subservient to the civilian government despite
fears that Humberto Ortega would simply rule the country through the military as is the
case in so many Latin American countries. The victory of Chamorro demonstrated that
a revolutionary government could give up power. Chamorro has loosened restrictions
on the press and political speech, though much of the restriction of these by the
Sandinistas was due to a state of war. All in all political freedom has become more
widespread with the end of the CIA operation.
The results of the Contra operation have yet to completely play out in
Nicaragua. The population is suffering from an economic standpoint, but their political
freedoms have increased. Adding together positive increases in political freedom with
negative economic effects gives a score of 0. Further down the road it may be possible
to access the full benefit or harm of the operation.
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C onclusions

Assigning the number values to the Nicaragua operation and its seven areas
comes up overall with a -5 on a scale of -28 to 28. Each of the areas is accorded a
value beginning with +7 to -7 for foreign policy goals and finishing with +1 to -1 for
the benefit for the general population.

Table 3 Nicaragua
Foreign policy goals

+7

Operational goals

-5

Long term effects

0

Covertness

-3

Democratic standards

-3

Efficient expenditure

-1

Benefit general population

0

Total for Nicaragua operation: -5

Overall this describes the Nicaragua operation as a mild failure given the criteria. While
foreign policy goals were clearly met, very little else was clear in the Nicaraguan case.
Also the CIA had only part of the role to play in the final victory by the Chamorro
government, its classical election interference role absorbed by the overt NED. Thus
the operation in Nicaragua was a failure as a covert operation.
Things are unlikely to change in the future with regards to the scoring of
Nicaragua. Several factors could actually change for the worse in the next few years.
Data will become available to better evaluate the progress observed for the general
population. As well, the election of 1996 will be quite important in assessing the

longer term effects of the CIA operation. Should the Sandinistas return to power in
1996 the long term effects would take a negative turn.
In the end Nicaragua was an expensive failure. Still the Chamorro government
was able to grab the reins of power after ten years of covert warfare. The eventual
success of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy goals were met at a very high price. The
problem was that the CIA was asked to engage in covert warfare by means of a proxy
army while the President talked about the connection on national news. The CIA was
also ill used in the sense that many of its tasks had been taken over by overt means
including overt election interference campaigns by the NED. Mining the barbors with
its own personnel was a terrible miscalculation. While the Nicaraguan operation was
underway the CIA was slowly evolving out of its Cold War thinking. Covert actions
had been a way of fighting communism short of conventional war. The CIA held on to
too many practices that had failed before in Laos and Iran—developing paramiltary
operations without a political arm and promising continued support that would quickly
be withdrawn as soon as the political winds shifted. Unlike the Nicarguan operation
both those operations were developed primarily to keep costs high for the North
Vietnamese and the Iraqis.
The operation in Nicaragua is an example of why the CIA's role needs to be
reexamined and reconsidered. It is possible that the same results could have been
achieved without the CIA's involvement, without ever having to support the Contras.
Much of the intervention in Nicaragua was overt, ruling out the need for CIA
involvement. The importance of the NED in winning the election may be a good
example of how future interventions can take place without the dangers involved in
covert actions.
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Chapter IV

"A Soviet Vietnam"
In the case of Afghanistan, the U.S. had no long history of intervention as in
Nicaragua. Afghanistan fell far outside the traditional sphere of U.S. influence and
even outside the oil producing regions of the Persian Gulf which had become so vital to
U.S. interests in the second half of the century. Afghanistan was a poor, sparsely
populated country bordering the Soviet Union and Iran. Still the United States would
be drawn into the conflict based on the containment notions of NSC 68.
The history of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan dates back primarily to the
founding of Pakistan in 1947. Pakistan claimed within its borders an area inhabited
mainly by Pushtuns, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Due to this disagreement
over honoring the Durand Line as Pakistan’s border Afghanistan "alone cast its votes
against Pakistan's admission to the world organization. (United Nations)"! Eventually
the border issue would push Afghanistan much closer to the Soviet Union. Pakistan
found allies with Iran under the Shah and the United States thus necessitating that
Afghanistan would be left to the Soviet Union. Indeed the Soviet Union became and
"continued to be the major supplier of military and economic aid, and the dependence of
the Afghan government on this aid was ever growing. "2 This close relationship with
the Soviet Union is not unusual given its proximity to the superpower, indeed, it is
unlikely that Afghanistan could have pursued a close relationship with the West.
Explicit communist influence began with the overthrow of Kin Zahir Shah in
1973. He was overthrown by a cousin, Mohammed Daoud, who disagreed with the
king's policies regarding border disputes with Iran and Pakistan. In staging this coup
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he was aided by the military where he found "much support among a large section of
the military which he had modernized and equipped with Soviet assistance during his
tenure (as former defense minister)."^ While the importance of Soviet trained officers
in the coup is often cited as evidence that the coup was planned by Moscow, Selig S.
Harrison argues that "subsequent events showed that he saw them as expedient,
temporary allies who could easily be controlled or discarded when convenient. "4 Still
the 1973 coup is seen as the first significant step towards the eventual Soviet invasion.
Daoud was generally a nationalist, willing to seek the help of the Soviet Union
only to further his nationalist goals. After a time he moved away from the Soviet
Union's sphere of influence seeking to be a truly non-aligned nation. He sought aid
from oil rich Islamic countries and even came to terms with Pakistan over border
issues. His course of action was fruitful considering the millions in economic aid
received from both Iran and Saudi Arabia, still it was a dangerous course considering
the proximity of the Soviets. Afghanistan as a poor Third World nation would always
have to lean towards the Soviet Union even when claiming to be a member of the nonaligned movement. His dealings with Iran encouraged distrust among the Soviets
which led Daoud "to lean ever more towards Iran for intelligence support, which in turn
further strengthened the Soviet fears and distrust.

Moving away from the Soviet

Union would turn out to be a tragic mistake.
Soon after the 1973 coup Daoud had begun to move against communists in the
government. He had appointed many of them to high posts, but it was not long before
he "quietly started removing hard-line leftists from their governmental positions and
shuffling around those whom he thought would not pose any threat."^ In July of 1974
he removed two hundred officers who had trained in the Soviet Union.? Daoud's own
coup had proved to the communist party leadership that a takeover was well within their
means. As Daoud cracked down on the communists, Moscow was forcing them
together. There were two rival groups within the party, the Khalq faction and the

Parcham faction. The Parcham communists had been those taken into the government
under Daoud. The Parcham communists were less orthodox Marxist-Leninist and
favored by Moscow. The Khalq faction and its leaders were seen as too headstrong
and ambitious by Moscow. While the Soviet Union was important in this decision to
unify the factions, "in the final analysis, it was their common fear that Daoud, with the
support of Iran and by turning to the oligarchic elite, was preparing for a final move to
destroy the leftist movement."** By moving strongly against the communists and
towards the West, Daoud had brought his own downfall.
The coup would come in 1978. A visitor to Afghanistan at the time Selig
Harrison describes the state of the country:
Looking back on the year preceding the Communist coup, I remember vividly the siege
mentality that pervaded the Afghan government Daoud had drifted increasingly into the self
isolation so characteristic of dictators. His insistence on unquestioning personal loyalty and
total control over even minor administrative details drove many capable advisers out of
government. While Daoud himself lived a austere life, corruption charges against his
intimates, some related to aid transactions, cast a pall over his regime.^

The catalyst would prove to be the murder of Mir Akbar Khaiber, an old Marxist with
many connections to communist military officers. Two days later over fifteen thousand
angry mourners showed up for his funeral where top communist leaders addressed the
crowd. Soon after many party leaders were arrested including General Secretary Noor
Mohammed Taraki, but mistakenly a key figure, Hafizullah Amin, was only put under
house arrest. Amin simply passed the plans for the coup by his guards, and on April
27th, 1978 the coup began. A tank division and one wing of the air force participated
and soon the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the PDPA was in control. The
coup "succeeded with such a limited number of troops participating in the fighting,"
because the Afghan Army stayed on the sidelines waiting to see which way the winds
would blow.
Moscow's part in the coup had been minor. Kurt Lohbeck, a reporter for CBS
News who spent extensive time in Afghanistan, argues that the KGB planned the coup
in detail just two weeks before the actual coup. *1 Rasul Rais counters this explaining

that it was planned by the leaders of the PDPA, adding that only "circumstantial
evidence" of Moscow's involvement can be found. 12 Soviet involvement at any level
was largely a response to events in Afghanistan. Obviously the Soviets would approve
of any removal of Daoud especially by the indigenous communist party. Selig
Harrison contends that Moscow had strongly advised against a coup, but that once one
was underway they would not consider betraying the PDPA by revealing it.
Moscow had a role in the coup, but only after being informed of it by the PDPA. After
being informed Moscow waited and then quickly recognized the new government. Still
in the years ahead Moscow would get much more closely involved in palace coups.
Taraki would assume the leadership of Afghanistan for only a short period.
Before the PDPA could effectively consolidate its rule, a ruthless Amin would win a
new struggle for power. The Soviets found Amin to be unreliable and dangerous.
Amin attempted to erase the Parcham faction of the party, especially from positions of
power. Pushing ahead with land reform and equality for women Amin angered the
Soviets who saw the moves as "ill prepared, much too ambitious, and certain to
provoke bitter opposition from rural vested interests, stoking the fires of a nascent
insurgency that would be exploited by Pakistan and the United States to destabilize the
new

r e g im e ."

14 During Taraki's rule Amin was in charge of a raid on the separatist

group, Setam-i-Milli, that went terribly wrong ending in the death of the kidnapped
American ambassador. The decision to launch the failed raid led to the end of
meaningful relations with the United States.
Amin had emerged as the true power in the government. An insurgency by
Islamic groups within the country was underway, and though it was not really a threat
to overthrow the government it was significant. Taraki appealed to the Soviets to
intervene with troops, but on March 20th of 1979 Moscow formally rejected the request
for troops. After an uprising in Herat the Soviet government was convinced that the
insurgents had actual indigenous support, and that Amin was going too far. In the

summer of 1979 Moscow began to circulate a plan of setting up a national "democratic"
leadership in hopes of producing a government less offensive to the Afghan population.
While communists would play prominent roles, Taraki would step down as president to
be replaced by a non-communist.
Moscow would never get the chance to act on its designs. Amin seized power
after learning of the planned coup against him. On October 9, 1979 Amin executed
Taraki and took full control of the country. The execution almost certainly led to the
final decision by the Soviet Union to intervene. Though the Soviets were forced to deal
with Amin, he also relied almost totally on the Soviets to prop up his regime. At this
point it was too late to make amends with Soviet leaders, and "neither his expressions
of gratitude to the Soviet Union nor his professions of loyalty to the socialist
Commonwealth earned him Brezhnev's affection."*6 Amin's rule would be quite
short.
Amin's rule came to an end on December 24, 1979. The final decision to
invade was authorized by Brezhnev despite reservations from many military leaders.
Three days later "a special KGB hit team supported by Soviet airborne commandos
assassinated President Hafizullah Amin, thus officially setting in motion the USSR's
occupation of A

fg h a n is ta n ."

The whole operation was executed almost to perfection.

As soon as Amin was gone Babrak Karmal was installed as the new president and
quickly called for Soviet help, thus giving an official justification for the invasion. ^
The Afghan army had been disabled earlier by Soviet advisors who had claimed to be
winterizing heavy equipment Installing their own puppet government allowed them to
intervene with regular troops while claiming to be nobly protecting a neighbor from
rebellion.
The West’s reaction was swift. The United States instituted a grain embargo
against the Soviets and condemned their invasion as an act of brutality. Brezhnev and
others had underestimated the response of the United States assuming that after some

hand wringing the United States would do nothing substantial. Carter was visibly
upset when Brezhnev responded to a letter condemning the invasion with the response
that they had not invaded Afghanistan, but merely been invited in. 19 Afghanistan
changed Carter's mind set on covert actions according to Stansfield Turner, "thus it
was that the Carter administration, despite its dedication to human rights and its
considerable reservations about the morality of covert actions, turned easily and quickly
to covert devices to respond to some of these despotic acts."20 Eventually the United
States would spend over two billion on covert actions against the Soviets in
Afghanistan, making it the most expensive covert action in history.21

Foreign Policy Goals

The foreign policy goal attempted in Afghanistan was clear. It was to increase
the stakes for the Soviets. More simply it was an attempt to turn Afghanistan into the
Soviet Vietnam.

Initially there was little hope of pushing the Soviets out of

Afghanistan. The hope was that the United States could engage the Soviets covertly
without involving any U.S. personnel.
Policy in Afghanistan was never as confused as policies in Nicaragua. The
United States was quite clear about its support for the Mujahideen if technically stating
a policy of noninvolvement. There was always public support for the operation.
Unlike Nicaragua, the Afghanistan policy "enjoyed near-unanimous support from the
American people and

C o n g re ss.

"22 The public supported the Carter, Reagan, and

Bush administations' goals in Afghanistan despite knowing only the broad features of
the operation.
Initially among Carter's advisors Brzezinski was biggest supporter of the policy
of bleeding the Soviet Union. Stansfield Turner was not initially convinced that arming
the Mujahideen would be more than an encouragement to commit suicide against a

vastly superior Red

A rm y.

23 The United States had armed similar groups before

encouraging them towards suicidal rebellions with promises of U.S. help. Early in the
CIA's history the agency took part in an operation to help foster rebellion in Tibet
against the Chinese communists.24 The operation was a disaster, one of few early
failures for the fledgling CIA. Still with Carter’s enthusiasm for punishing the Soviets
and Brzezinski's favoring of covert intervention funding for the Mujahideen pressed
ahead.
The foreign policy goal was simply to bleed the Soviets in Afghanistan. In the
early stages there wasn’t much hope that the United States could turn Afghanistan into a
Soviet Vietnam. "American policy aimed first, through clandestine arms shipments, at
keeping the invading Soviet army from occupying the whole country and then at
making the cost of "just holding on" so high that the Soviets would decide to bring their
forces

hom e.

"25 The eventual success of the Mujahideen was above and beyond all

expectations. There was also major concern in keeping the Soviet Union contained in
Afghanistan, not letting them advance into Pakistan or Iran. This concern would lead
to the Carter Doctrine and the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). Essentially Carter
argued that the U.S. needed to quickly create an armed force that could respond
instantly to events around the world, primarily this meant the Middle East. The Carter
Doctrine was created to inform the Soviets that if they if they invaded Iran the United
States would consider it an act of aggression and deploy troops to stop the Soviets even
if Iran wanted no such help. The Soviets never crossed the line in the sand. Without
the need for direct U.S. involvement, the Soviets suffered a humiliating defeat. From a
foreign policy standpoint Afghanistan was certainly the most successful covert action of
the 1980s.
Afghanistan is often compared to Vietnam. There are distinct parallels:
invasions of sovereign nations, propping up of unpopular local rulers, underestimates
of national liberation movements. Still there are important differences. In pursuing the
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war against the Mujahideen "the Kremlin has been much more restrained m

ilita rily " 2 6

than the United States was in Vietnam. The Soviets were never willing to commit
much more than a hundred thousand troops in Afghanistan versus the United States'
much larger commitment in Vietnam. The drain on the Soviet Union was significant,
but it had little to do with the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.
George Kennan and others argue that the Soviet Union collapsed in spite of and
not because of the foreign policies of the United States. Indeed Kennan argues in
general that the "effect of cold war extremism was to delay rather then hasten the great
change that overtook the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. "27 Diego Cordovez
and Selig S. Harrison argue that those who accept the Cold War model and give most
of the credit for the collapse of the Soviet Union to Reagan's policies can carry the
Afghanistan interpretation to an extreme giving "the CIA’s covert operation in
Afghanistan credit not only for ending the Cold War but also for bringing about the
dissolution of the Soviet

U n i o n . "28

So while Afghanistan was a brilliant foreign

policy success, it cannot be considered a significant factor in the end of the Cold War.
In the final analysis, Afghanistan yielded an important Cold War victory. The
initial goal was to simply contain the Soviets and inflict casualties. Instead the Afghan
Mujahideen bled the Soviet military dry and drove them back across the border, by
making the price of victory simply too high to maintain. For meeting U.S. goals the
Afghan operation scores a +7.

Initial foreign policy goals were exceeded in

Afghanistan.

Operational Goals

The main operational goal in Afghanistan was to arm the Mujahideen and turn
them into a significant headache for the Soviets. The CIA has converted many rebels

into proxy armies for the U.S. in the past, Afghanistan falling somewhere between the
Kurds in Iraq and the Contras in Nicaragua.
Problems crept into the Afghan operation early. Charles G. Cogan in an article
entitled, "Partner's in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan Since 1979," makes a long list
of the operational failures in Afghanistan:
Some accuse amateurs in the CIA of letting the infamous Interservices Intelligence Directorate
(ISI) of Pakistan handle everything. ISI, the argument goes, gave most of the weaponry to
the fundamentalists, who as was abundantly clear early on, were going to install a
fundamentalist and anti-American regime in Kabul at the end of the war. ISI, notoriously
corrupt, siphoned off a substantial portion of the weapons and either sold them or kept them
for other battles, most notably in Kashmir and the Punjab. The CIA neither monitored the
inflow of weapons nor arranged to get weapons into the hands of the good commanders in the
field. Meanwhile, the main recipients of the arms~the political parties in Peshawar-were
engaged in a brisk traffic in drugs, and Washington overlooked Pakistan's nuclear program
because it did not want to antagonize an ally. And finally, the CIA was so unimaginative and
so cautious that it was slow to provide the insurgents with non-Soviet (i.e. non-deniable)
weapons, thus delaying for months, if not for years, the departure of the Soviets.^

Cogan admits that these criticisms of the operation are valid, but he argues that the
brilliant foreign policy success outweighs the operational problems since in the end "the
policy worked. "30 So despite a partially flawed operation the foreign policy goals
were indeed reached.
Pakistan was not the most pliant of American client states. Indeed in many past
operations CIA client states were quite friendly and reliant on the United States. This
was not the case with Pakistan. Carter kept levels of aid to the Mujahideen low
primarily because of "the coolness of his relation with General Zia, leader of the
strategic front-line state of Pakistan. "31 The Reagan administration reversed this policy
by actively aiding the Mujahideen. While the Carter administration had been snubbed
by Zia for offering only a $400 million dollar aid package, the Reagan administration
jumped in with quick support and a gentlemen's agreement to ignore Pakistan's nuclear
program. The Reagan administration simply "asked for and received a Congressional
waiver" of the Symingnton amendment which prevented the government from
supplying weapons to countries engaged in nuclear weapons p r o g r a m

s .3 2

Eventually

Zia would be rewarded with a three billion dollar deal and 4 0 new F - 1 6 A s . 3 3

Pakistan also insisted on handling the aid to the Mujahideen. This was
primarily to keep the CIA from running an independent operation and to benefit by
siphoning off some of the weapons. The amount of seized weapons was quite
substantial:
As a matter of policy, the Pakistan military laid claim to a share of the weapons' flow. Zia's
armed forces saw it as their right to appropriate weapons from CIA shipments and the CIA ,
in effect, condoned the theft as a sort o f commission, as the way one does business with the
government of Pakistan. It is believed that at least 20 percent of the arms and perhaps more
than 30 percent were siphoned off from the supply pipelines.^

All of this was in addition to the massive aid program for Pakistan which was
essentially a bribe to let the CIA conduct the covert operation for the Mujahideen. In
essence Pakistan was double dipping. At one point in 1987 ISI's main ammo dump
exploded spectacularly. Both the KGB and Mujahideen were blamed as possible
culprits, but Kurt Lohbeck implies that the ammo dump may well have been blown sky
high to hide the skimming operation that the ISI was conducting. An audit was to be
conducted by the Inspector General's Office of the U.S. Defense Department, but the
explosion conveniently ended those p l a n s . 3 5
The operation was also run essentially by the Pakistanis. While the CIA
supplied arms and some intelligence, the Pakistanis did everything else. Pakistan's
military and secret intelligence (ISI) organized the Mujahideen parties, planned
individual missions, organized the refugee camps, and distributed the weapons.
Pakistan selected seven parties to represent the various Mujahideen Islamic factions:
National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), Afghanistan National Liberation Front
(ANLF), Movement of the Islamic Revolution (HAR), Islamic Party of Afghanistan
(Hikmatyar) (HIH), Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Khalis) (HEK), Islamic Society of
Afghanistan (JIA), and Islamic Union for the Freedom of Afghanistan (ITT). Even
within this system Pakistan played favorites giving over half of the aid to one group,
the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, led by Gulbiddin H e k m

a ty a r .3 6

Though this was the

worst group to support in the American view, General Zia hoped that "once

Afghanistan was rid of the Soviet invaders, Hekmatyar, by far the most religiously
conservative of the Afghan Mujahideen leaders, was expected to set up an Islamic state
of the type favored by Saudi Arabia and Zia

u l- H a q ." 3 7

Obviously Pakistan was

pursuing its own interests with the Mujahideen.
The Pakistanis were also in charge of the supply system whereby arms were
shipped to the insurgents. After arriving in the country arms were transferred directly
to the Pakistani authorities. From there the arms were divided up by the Pakistanis, the
lion's share going to the more radical Islamic parties. Then they were transported to the
Mujahideen commanders in the field. When they reached the commanders they would
then be paid for mostly by the Saudi Red Crescent with Saudi funds. The commanders
associated with the more nationalist parties would generally have to pay almost the full
transport cost, meaning they would have to sell back a portion of the arms to pay for
the shipment of the rest. By forcing non-Islamic parties to pay for almost total
transportation costs, thereby forcing them to sell weapons, the ISI could then point to
the corruption of these groups versus the well supported Islamic g r o u p s . 38
Opium also became a serious problem. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran had
always been opium producing regions, but before the Soviet invasion they had not been
a serious exporter of opium or heroin. By 1990 Afghanistan was second in the world
in the production of both opium and h a s h i s h . 3 9 The drugs were not manufactured by
the Soviet invaders, but rather by the Mujahideen. Indeed in the early 1980s the
Mujahideen "used their new CIA munitions to capture prime agricultural areas inside
A fg h a n is ta n " ^

which were then planted with opium poppies. The poppies would be

processed into heroin and sold for arms or money to Pakistanis who would smuggle
the drugs out of the country or sell them inside Pakistan. By 1986 Pakistan was in the
midst of a terrible heroin crisis with over 1.3 million addicts.41
The pursuit of opium also led to a less effective Mujahideen.

Many

commanders became caught up in turf wars over fertile opium regions. Indeed, some

became little more than petty drug warlords, more prone to fighting other Mujahideen
then the Soviets. One of the largest traffickers was Hekmatyar who received over half
the CIA's support by way of the ISI, an agency also involved in the drug trade. While
Hekmatyar would later gain control of the majority of the opium fields, during the war
he held a "complex of heroin laboratories at Koh-i-Soltan at the southern end of
Helmand just across the border inside

P a k is ta n ,

"42 with the help of the ISI. Heroin

moving through the ISI also just added to the corruption of the Pakistani intelligence
agency, which the CIA had entrusted to run the operation.
The CIA hurt itself by choosing to heavily support the radical Islamists. As
already noted, the Islamic Party of Afghanistan run by Gulbiddin Hekmatyar received
over half of the aid in weapons and money from the C I A . 4 3 Many accounts of the war
explain that the seven parties were supported on the basis of their effectiveness in
fighting the Soviets. Under this system the three major Islamic parties should have
been by far the most effective since they received approximately 75% of the American
aid.44 If this was a valid justification for the varied aid levels in the seven different
groups then certainly at least Hekmatyar’s faction should have received less.
Some observers of the Afghan war support the contention that the Islamic
parties were the most effective fighting forces, especially Hekmatyar. Rasul Bakhsh
Rais contends that Hekmatyar ran a "most effective guerrilla organization," but that he
was given "disproportionately large economic and military

re so u rc e s.

"45 Barnett R.

Rubin argues that though the Islamic Party of Afghanistan was the "most disciplined of
the Islamist parties," Hekmatyar "consistently placed the long-term goal of Islamic
revolution above resistance to the Soviets or to the Kabul r e g i m

e.

"46 Other observers

are less flattering. Marvin G. Wienbaum reports that:
Although a number of field commanders in Afghanistan were intensely loyal to Hezb-i-Islami,
their forces were in fact neither the largest nor most effective. Oddly, ISI officials seemed
more impressed with the frequent ruthlessness of Hekmatyar's leaders than with the scope of
their fighting or accomplishments against Soviet and Kabul government troops. Given Hezbi-Islami's limited popular base within Afghanistan, only with direct Pakistani support could it
hope, after a resistance victory, to be a successful contender for power in K a b u l .4 7

And Wienbaum is not alone in his criticism. Abdul Haq, one of the most successful
and respected Mujahideen commanders, told U.S. policy makers repeatedly that
Gulbiddin was virulently anti-American, had no significant force within Afghanistan,
had never won a large battle, and had no commanders of renown under him.4 8
Hekmatyar was constantly blamed for ambushing other Mujahideen parties even in the
midst of battle, and Edward R. Girardet described him as "ruthless, uncompromising,
and d e v i o u s . "49 Hekmatyar could certainly surpass Amin's exploits in his short term
in office were he ever to come to power in Afghanistan. Alfred W. McCoy describes
the CIA decision to heavily support Hekmatyar as "dismal."50 The CIA built
Hekmatyar the largest Mujahideen army which he then used to establish himself as a
drug lord, to attack other parties, and to try to establish an Islamic state along the lines
of Iran, most importantly, following Iran's anti-American line.
In conclusion the operational goals were met though the operation itself was
"far from flawless. "51 Corruption, drugs, and support for fundamentalists were all
serious errors. Due to these problems the Afghan operatiion only recieves a +2 with
regard to reaching its goals. In the end the operational goals were met despite
numerous mistakes, chief among them an over reliance on the Pakistanis who
practically ran the operation.

Long Term Success

In the short term the Afghan operation was an overwhelming success. The
Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan in 1989 ending what Gorbachev had termed in
1986 as a "bleeding

w ound.

"52

it was assumed that the communist puppet

government would fall almost instantly without its sponsor. Still much as in Vietnam
the Soviets pulled out while continuing to send tons of military equipment to the
embattled Afghan army. An assault on Jalalabad near the Pakistani border was

supposed to be the first step in establishing a new government under the Mujahideen—
Jalalabad would be the first capital of a new, free Afghanistan.
The assault on Jalalabad would prove to be a terrible disaster. The Mujahideen
commanders were unable to unify the command structure resulting in uncoordinated
attacks against Jalalabad. Political infighting continued, and the operation was pushed
by the ISI, not the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen suffered heavy casualties and were
unsuccessful at permanently closing the supply route from Kabul. The Mujahideen
also hurt their own cause by "inflicting heavy civilian casualties and killing some
prisoners, actions that strengthened the will of the garrison to r e s i s t . "5 3 Indeed this
"unsuccessful and costly Mujahideen attempt to capture" Jalalabad resulted in increased
aid.54 Aid dried up after the Soviet pullout, but in an attempt to save face in the last
days of the cold war the United States stepped up aid to the Mujahideen.
One of the most obvious contradictions in the operation was the support for
radical Islamic factions of the Mujahideen. The Islamic parties were consistently
supplied with the bulk of the arms, and the initial reason for not providing Stinger
missiles was the general fear that some of the Stingers would end up in the hands of
fundamentalist terrorists. Some like Angelo Codevilla and Kurt Lohbeck argue that
their was no real danger in giving the Mujahideen Stingers. Lohbeck argues that since
Iran was a Shii'a Muslim nation the Mujahideen would never hand Stingers over to
th e m .

55 Codevilla dismisses the CIA's warning about a possible diversion to terrorists

as a "throwaway

lin e ." 5 6

Both Codevilla and Lohbeck give the Stingers credit for

turning the tide of the war in late 1986, for Lohbeck it was "unquestionable" that the
Stingers changed the course of the
already decided

it

w a r .5 7

in retrospect by 1986 the Politburo had

was time to disengage from

A f g h a n is ta n .5 8

The Stingers merely

made the war costlier, but they were not quite the dramatic turning point they seemed at
the time. Mark Urban implies that intelligence officers at the time thought the Stingers
had made a huge difference, but that in reality the Stingers had little real military effect.

The Stingers probably helped most by increasing morale among the

M u ja h id e e n .
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And the CIA's worries about Stingers ending up in the wrong hands seems quite
justified given the level of corruption in getting arms to the Mujahideen, and corruption
within the Mujahideen themselves.
The support of radical Islamists would eventually wind up with serious
repercussions for the United States. In 1993 the United States endured the bombing of
the World Trade Center. The blame would eventually fall on Pakistani-trained
fundam entalists.^ Elie Krakowski, an adviser to Assistant Secretary of Defense
Richard Perle, a rare critic of the policy of letting the Pakistani's have a free hand in
managing the operation, predicted that supporting fundamentalists would be counter
productive in the long term. Still as an advisor he had little effect on p o l i c y . 61 Even
liberal Pakistanis blame part of the Pakistan's problems with fundamentalism on the
United States since Washington "turned a blind eye to Zia's wider agenda while it used
him to arm the Afghan Mujahideen f i g h t e r s . " 6 2 in Afghanistan the CIA was willing to
support groups who shared the same philosophies and ideals as the government of
Iran, the Party of God in Lebanon, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Algeria.
It was a short term calculation that was bound to backfire. And the CIA had other
choices. Three of the recognized parties in Afghanistan were nationalistic parties who
did not embrace a revolutionary Islam. And even among the Islamic groups their were
more moderate factions, but the Pakistanis with reluctant CIA acquiescence allowed the
greatest part of the aid to be funneled to Gulbiddin Hekmatyar's faction, the most
radical and virulently anti-American of all the p a r t i e s . ^
The end of the operation did not mean an end to the drug problem within the
Afghan Mujahideen:
By early 1990 the CIA's Afghan operation had proved doubly disastrous. After ten years of
covert operations at a cost of $2 billion, America was left with Mujahideen warlords whose
skill as drug dealers exceeded their competence as military commanders. In 1989, as the cold
war ended and the Bush administration's war on drugs began, Afghan leaders like the opium
warlord Hekmatyar had become a diplomatic embarrassment for the United States.^

By supporting the Mujahideen in spite of their drug connections the CIA was
complicitly involved in the heroin trade itself. Allegations against the Contras with
respect to drugs had damaged support for the Nicaraguan operation. In the end, "the
cultivation of opium and the refining of heroin in Afghanistan ultimately contribute to
the drug problem in the United States, since at least part of the Afghan harvest will end
up in the veins of American drug

a b u se rs.

"65 The long term effects of ignoring the

opium production could be quite catastrophic.
Another long term problem is the CIA support for the Islamic factions heavily
involved in the opium trade. In an effort to lower opium production USAID offered to
give millions of dollars in aid if the Mujahideen would discontinue the opium
h a rv e s t.

66 One opium warlord, Naseem Akhundzada, agreed to the ban in exchange

for aid. Naseem’s followers controlled the important Helmand River valley, so the ban
on opium production there was significant.

In March of 1990 Naseem was

assassinated by followers of Hekmatyar who controlled the manufacturing of heroin in
Pakistan. Instead of attempting to create a new government in Afghanistan, Hekmatyar
and his Islamic Party of Afghanistan were involved in drug wars. The problem
continued to worsen with regards to opium production in Afghanistan.
One small footnote to the Afghanistan operation was the involvement of the
BCCI. BCCI, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, or more appropriately
the "Bank of Crooks and Criminals International" as Robert Gates would later deem it,
was heavily involved in the Afghanistan

o p e ra tio n .

67 Though BCCI would finally

collapse in 1991, "the CIA transferred funds for weapons to the Mujahideen," through
BCCI and "BCCI also helped the CIA, NSC, and other U.S. agencies supply weapons
clandestinely to the

M u ja h id e e n .

"68 The founder of the BCCI, Agha Hasan Abedi,

was a Pakistani with heavy connections to the Pakistani government and military.
Indeed, after the collapse of BCCI, "investigators found a check to President Zia from
BCCI for 40 million rupees--$2 m

illio n .

"69 BCCI in its final collapse had only $1.2

billion in assets that could be located out of some $20 billion in actual assets. Much of
the missing money was believed to been stolen and used to fund other covert
o p e r a tio n s .7 0

With the fall of BCCI the CIA was pulled into another scandal showing

it in a bad light. So by using BCCI the CIA had to suffer the negative publicity of
being heavily involved in a very dirty financial affair, and the possibility that the CIA
had used BCCI to finance operations without Congressional oversight or approval.
Finally, the situation on the ground in Afghanistan was a disaster. After the
collapse of the Soviet empire, Afghanistan reverted to its long held status as a forgotten
part of the world. U.S. aid dried up falling to only 6 million dollars between 1993 and
1994.71 Zalmay Kahalilzad sums up the situation in 1994:
Failing to win after almost a decade of war, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989.
Their failure may have contributed to the destruction of the USSR, but the success of the
effort against them did not bring peace to Afghanistan. The war continued, first against the
Najib government left behind by the Soviets; its defeat in 1992 finally brought the Afghan
resistance groups-the Mujahideen-to power, but they have failed to govern the country and
the war has turned into a brutal civil conflict fought not over ideological, sectarian, or ethnic
differences-although these factors are part of the setting but over who should g o v e r n . ^

The capital Kabul lay in ruins, over 75% destroyed, a replication of Lebanon high in
the mountain p l a t e a u s . 7 3 The country was in tatters not only due to the invasion of the
Soviet Union, but also because of the Mujahideen the CIA had supported. The
Mujahideen that had never been forced into a unified political body. The Mujahideen
that had for some been more interested in harvesting opium than fighting the Soviets.
The Mujahideen that had been manipulated by the Pakistanis who had no interest in a
strong nationalistic, united Afghanistan. In the end the Mujahideen had tom their
beloved country apart
In the final analysis Afghanistan is a broken country. The United States only
wanted to raise the stakes for the Soviets letting "Islamabad use American aid leverage
to settle old scores with Afghan nationalist adversaries and to pursue its own strategic
objective of a Pakistan-dominated postwar A

fg h a n is ta n .

"74 Afghanistan has remained

a chaotic mess well supplied with U.S. weapons and battle hardened fundamentalists.

While the Soviets were driven out, Afghanistan will remain in dire straits for many
years to come, and the U.S. can expect the Afghans to have an unwelcome impact on
much of the Middle East and, at least in one case, the United States itself.
Considering the long term picture for Afghanistan a score of -4 is warranted.
While Afghanistan has yet to launch massive terrorist strikes on the U.S. it has both the
capability and the will. The World Trade Center bombing is already a significant
warning. Opium production has had an effect on the U.S. heroin market driving down
prices and creating more addicts. The only positive note about long term prospects for
Afghanistan is that the situation could be worse. So far Stinger missiles have not been
used in any terrorist attacks involving Americans.

C overtness

In a direct parallel to Nicaragua the covert operation in Afghanistan was run
overtly. In the early days of covert aid the Carter administration could have plausibly
denied helping the Mujahideen, but upon Reagan's assumption of office there was no
question that the United States was aiding the Mujahideen. Angelo Codevilla, a well
respected intelligence expert, presents the argument that "in the case of Afghanistan,
presidents used covert action to run away from an

is s u e .

"75 The first public notice

came with the announcement in 1980 by Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana.76 Gregory
Treverton refers to the operation as an "open secret, more unacknowledged than
unknown.

Codevilla argues that the operation in Afghanistan was kept covert in

order to avoid the problems of winning support in Congress and with the public. It
nicely avoided most of the usual restraints on presidential power. Still in the case of
Afghanistan the decision to go the covert route, considering the amount of public
support is troubling. Covert actions had passed into the realm of real oversight with

official intelligence committees; they were not the unrestrained instruments of the
executive that they had been for Truman and Eisenhower.
It is difficult to justify the need for keeping the aid program covert. At no time
did the Soviets not understand who was behind the Mujahideen's armaments, be they
Soviet models or not. It was obvious that someone other than Saudi Arabia was
involved with the Mujahideen, and Pakistani's role could not be disguised. If the target
nation of the operation knows who is behind the operation and U.S. citizens know who
is behind the operation, what gain is there in hiding the operation?
Gregory Treverton argues that the U.S. hardly needed to keep the aid program
to the Mujahideen secret.

Obviously the secret was an open one, simply

unacknowledged. The reason articulated by Treverton was the need to keep Pakistan
happy since the Pakistanis "were prepared to support them but unwilling to be too
visible in doing so lest it antagonize its powerful neighbor, the Soviet Union. "78
While Pakistan claimed to the Soviets to be doing little to help the Mujahideen, the
Soviets clearly knew the degree of Pakistan's involvement. Indeed the Soviets
launched raids on border camps within Pakistan, though Pakistan rarely made any large
complaint over the incursions.
Angelo Codevilla persuasively argues that Pakistan never really cared whether
or not the operation was covert. He states:
The question with regard to Pakistan is this: Is Pakistan's acquiescence in serving as a conduit
for arms and other assistance for the Mujahideen based on the fact that the Soviet Union does
not know that such assistance is flowing through Pakistan? That seems unlikely. Rather the
Pakistanis cooperate because they are confident the United States will come to their aid should
they be attacked by the Soviet Union. Since the Russians know this, they refrain from
attacking. I suggest that the willingness of third parties to help in covert actions depends not
so much on the secrecy of their involvement as it does on their assurance that should the
action ever become overt, they will receive plenty of overt support.7^

According to Codevilla the answer there is no real reason to run the Afghanistan
operation covertly. The major contention that the Pakistani's insisted on secrecy does
not hold water. Whether the Pakistani's wanted the U.S. aid to remain secret or not,
they really only wanted assurances that the U.S. would come to their aid in the event of

a Soviet invasion. Pakistani insecurity was not the major reason for running the
operation covertly.
Afghanistan was another case of a "overt" covert action. While using the CIA
as a foreign policy tool, the administrations ducked responsibility. They neglected to
pursue a course of action in full view of the public, which obviously supported the
campaign in Afghanistan. Congress was certainly behind the program as well.
Congressman Charles Wilson of Texas, a member of the House Armed Services
Committee and a member of the House Intelligence committee, heavily backed the
Mujahideen hoping to "repay the Soviets for Vietnam."80 Congress also regularly
increased aid to the Mujahideen beyond the administration's requests. Indeed pursuing
a covert course of action may have hindered the Mujahideen early on.
Since the action was covert the CIA choose to supply the Mujahideen with
Soviet weaponry, so that the rebels could claim it was captured. The Mujahideen
would have to go without advanced U.S. weapons. The Soviet arms, "many of them
obsolete,"81 were helpful, but more sophisticated heavy weapons would have been a
greater help. When U.S. weapons were supplied the Mujahideen were successful in
attacks on the Soviet army. Angelo Codevilla charges that "the CIA purchased old
Soviet military equipment form Egypt and China, some of it in terrible condition,
paying more for junk than it would have for good Western equipment, in order to
maintain

"co v er.

"'82 The covert nature was actually harmful in terms of arming the

Mujahideen.
The case for covert action in Afghanistan was never convincingly made.
Afghanistan could have easily been run as a overt operation, which for all intents and
purposes it was. While the operation was hardly secret from the Soviets or the
American public, it also made little difference. The Afghan operation is a fine example
of how future covert actions can be run openly, possibly even without the use of the
CIA. The Afghanistan operation certainly had public and international support, and

could not possibly be hidden from the enemy, so it should have been run openly,
possibly by the Defense Department, in order that it could have been examined and
critiqued fully in the public sphere.
Was covertness merely an excuse to hide the problems of corruption, drugs,
and the Islamic ideals of our Mujahideen clients? Even if it was a cover for pubic
debate in the end it was less a problem then in Nicaragua where the Sandinistas could
expose embarrassing U.S. tactics, such as the assassination manual. In Afghanistan
there was little to gain by exposing any part of the operation since it was widely
supported and largely without controversy.
Afghanistan was an operation run openly. While significant details were kept
hidden the broad oudines of the intervention were obvious to the Soviets, the U.S.
public, and the press. The Afghan operation scores a -2 in the covertness category.
While the lack of secrecy did not doom the mission it certainly didn't help.

Democratic Standards

The question of democratic standards is important for the CIA in Afghanistan.
Mujahideen were more easily portrayed as freedom fighters than the Contras who had
never been subject to a Soviet invasion and were plagued from the start by heavy
National Guard influence. They were willing to fight a superior foe while suffering
heavy casualties. The Mujahideen had more concern for the civilians of Afghanistan
and the refugees who flooded across the borders. Living a Spartan existence they
defied the Russian bear. The question of whether the Mujahideen would bring
democracy to Afghanistan was largely ignored. As rebels they were never expected to
win, and even if they did they were at least anti-communists who would get rid of any
communist influence within the government.

Gregory Treverton assumes that there was never much concern with democracy
in Afghanistan. Supporting the Mujahideen in Afghanistan "was a way to put strategic
pressure on Soviet occupation of that country; given the character of the resistance
forces, it cannot be said to be a way to bring "democracy" to

A f g h a n is ta n .
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Certainly once the Mujahideen showed that they were capable of actually winning, there
should have been some concern with forming a government respecting of some
democratic principles. Truly, there was never a large attempt to develop the seven
Mujahideen parties into some sort of unified government. Eventually the situation
would erupt into open civil war among the Mujahideen factions.
The Mujahideen were not a well organized military force schooled in the
Geneva accords. They were hardened fighters who often performed summary
executions on captured prisoners. Indeed the Mujahideen saw little need to keep
prisoners alive who would only have to be fed and clothed. They had little use for
Western human rights norms and often violated them. The CIA did little to try to clean
up the Mujahideen, and the respect for human rights continues to be dismal in
Afghanistan.84
In Afghanistan at least the government could be seen as completely illegitimate,
backed by a Soviet invasion, a clear cut case of aggression, unlike Nicaragua. The
problems came more with the Mujahideen who the United States supported. Instead of
supporting more moderate factions, the CIA ended up supporting the factions that were
most against some sort of democratic process. Hekmatyar's idea of a democratic
republic was an Islamic state set up along the lines of the Ayatollah Khomeni's Iran.
For meeting democratic standards the operation scores a -2. Only the inherent
righteousness of fighting off a foreign invader keeps the score from falling to a -3. The
Mujahideen factions that were supported placed little worth in democratic values. They
were willing to tear down the country rather then allow anything but a fully Islamic
government from coming to power in Afghanistan. Considering that the U.S. had
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much better factions within the Mujahideen to support, supporting radical followers of
Islam violated any idea of instilling democratic values in a future Afghanistan.

Efficient Expenditure

The operation in Afghanistan is the most expensive CIA operation on record.
Over two billion dollars in arms and aid were fimneled to the Mujahideen, though some
ended up in the hands of the Pakistani military and intelligence. Where did all the
money go?
A significant portion of the munitions and aid were skimmed by the Pakistanis.
John Prados argues that:
The official neutrality (of Pakistan) creates a climate of graft on the Afghan supply lines,
which amounts to more than just the "cost of doing business." The most optimistic
estimates, from CIA sources, are that 20 percent of the aid is skimmed off. Some Afghan
groups put that figure as high as 85 percent. The very existence of such a wide range of
estimates indicates that there is little real accounting~no one actually knows what has
happened to all the covert action money .85

Prados is not alone in his assessments.*^ Corruption was rampant in the Pakistani ISI,
and as the CIA decided to entrust the Afghan operation to the ISI they had to accept a
high level of corruption. Still the ISI was, according to the CIA, "the most efficient,
and the least corrupt, organization in Pakistan, a statement that probably raises more
questions than it

a n sw e rs.

"8? While corruption was to be expected in such an

operation with huge amounts of money involved, the level of corruption in Pakistan
was quite high. Many Pakistani generals made fortunes out of the CIA operation.88
While CIA operations, especially large operations like Afghanistan, entail
significant interaction with local or regional powers, often "greasing" the palms of
pliant officials, the Afghan operation was excessive. Not only did the Pakistanis
receive a huge aid package, which has now dried up with the Soviet pullout, but they
received highly advanced F-16s even over Israeli protest. In general this could be
assumed to be enough of a "bribe" to let the CIA operate within Pakistan. Still the

Pakistanis under military rule also wanted a large chunk of the weapons destined for the
Mujahideen. On top of skimming weapons, Pakistanis were also involved in the
Mujahideen's drug trade buying raw opium or semi-processed heroin. Their most
favored Mujahideen party, Hekmatyar's, was heavily involved in the heroin tra d e d
In the end the Pakistanis skimmed at least 20 percent of the arms and aid from
the Afghanistan operation.^® While this is a conservative estimate, it still means that
approximately $500 million ended up in the hands of corrupt Pakistanis. This seems an
outrageous figure for a CIA operation where accounting is generally accurate, and
payoffs to local officials are small. Since the running of the Mujahideen was handled
largely by the ISI, the CIA was left out in the cold, hoping only that the bulk of the
weapons would make it to the Mujahideen. From a spending standpoint the Afghan
operation rates a -2. From a standpoint of spending, the Afghan operation was
extremely inefficient and corrupt.

Benefit to Population

The population of Afghanistan is worse off today then before the Soviet
invasion. It is less a sovereign nation than a collection of tribes and factions battling for
supremacy. Taking stock of the situation within the country in 1994 Asian Survey
concludes that "economic and humanitarian conditions worsened for the Afghans,
especially for residents of Kabul and for refugees. "91 Despite a massive aid program
to the Mujahideen throughout the 1980s Afghans are worse off today.
After the Soviets pulled out, Afghanistan soon returned to being just another
backward nation nestled in some unimportant comer of the world. Aid dwindled
precipitously, and success only hurt the Mujahideen in terms of U.S. aid. Afghanistan
became a casualty of the rapidly warming Cold War. The CIA itself claims that
"although reliable data are unavailable, gross domestic product is lower than 12 years

ago because of the loss of labor and capital and the disruption of trade and transport."92
Obviously economically Afghanistan is far worse off even after the Soviet pullout. Per
capita GDP is an estimated $200. Still the blame for Afghanistan's situation can be
leveled on the Soviet Union rather then the CIA.
As for political violence, it has only escalated since the Soviet pullout and the
fall of the communist government. Kabul lies in ruins, the result of warring factions
willing to fight for political domination at any cost Freedom House ranks Afghanistan
among those nations most lacking in freedom pointing to the intolerance of the
Mujahideen groups and leaders with their insistence on Islamic principles and laws.
According to Freedom House there exists credible reports that tens of thousands have
been killed since die fall of the communist government93 Freedom House is joined in
its assessment by other human rights monitors. The World Human Rights Guide for
1992 reports that human rights are "widely violated" within Afghanistan.94 Human
Rights Watch even reports that the United States is tied up in "indiscriminate attacks
against civilians."95 Some of the inaccurate rockets that are used to bombard cities like
Kabul were provided by the Iraqi government courtesy of the United States and Saudi
Arabia. After capturing large amounts of weapons in the Gulf War the United States
simply passed many of them on to the Mujahideen.96
Afghanistan, today, is a violent place without any stable political order or
general respect for human rights. A decade of war with the Soviets could have led to a
triumphant victory. It could have led peace at last for the civilian population. Instead
Afghanistan is a disaster. The population is worse off after the operation from any
standpoint earning the operation a -1 score for benefit to the population. Afghanistan is
a tragedy.
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Final Conclusions

Afghanistan scores a -2 on the scale. This makes Afghanistan a mild failure as
a covert action according to these criteria.

Table 4 Afghanistan
Foreign policy goals:

+7

Operational goals:

+2

Long term effects:

-4

Covertness:

-2

Democratic standards:

-2

Efficient expenditure:

-2

Benefit general population:

-1

Total for Afghan operation:

-2

Clearly Afghanistan was a major foreign policy success. It was less clear in almost
every other area. The only other positive score is given to operational goals. There
were numerous flaws in the operation, not the least being handing over control of the
Mujahideen to Pakistan. Still, the Mujahideen, armed with CIA weapons, did fight off
the Soviets. Then the picture becomes less rosy. In every other category the operation
gets a negative score. This is generally due to the present state of Afghanistan caused
in part by the CIA support for the most radical Islamic factions, many of which were
involved in corruption and drugs.
In the future there is little likelihood of any change. Afghanistan is not
threatening to form a stable democratic government in the near future or even a stable
government. The situation for the general civilian population is unlikely to improve
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significantly, especially since the local warlords are now armed to the teeth with
advanced weapons. Afghanistan despite throwing off the hug of the Russian bear is
unable to advance beyond the status of the poorest of countries, indeed ranking first in
infant mortality worldwide. And in the end the fundamentalist Mujahideen may come
back to haunt the United States and its allies as terrorists well bred with a hatred of
Washington.
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Chapter V
Agency without an Adversary
The reason for examining Nicaragua and Afghanistan was to use these case
studies to make an informed evaluation of the CIA after the Cold War. The CIA is now
under harsh examination. Created in the crucible of the Cold War the Agency is now
fighting for its life. Everything is being reconsidered from intelligence analyzing to
counterintelligence to covert actions. The focus of this study is covert actions as
defined in Chapter H After looking at the proposed reform plans the case studies will
be reexamined adding important evidence in favor of certain reform plans.
The precursor to today's examinations of the CIA' took place in the mid 1970s.
By the mid seventies the CIA had lost the sterling image of a young agency boldly
fighting the Cold War. The golden age of CIA operations had passed with the 1950s,
and Vietnam was winding down. Instead of the successes of Iran and Guatemala, there
were the failures of Cuba and Chile. After Watergate and the exit of President Nixon,
the next target of a reform minded Congress was the secretive CIA.
Congress would eventually form two committees to look into the CIA. The
Pike committee in the House returned a scathing condemnation of the Agency.
Embroiled in controversy, the committee's final report was suppressed by the full
House and was leaked to the Village Voice. The Church committee in the Senate also
released a report highly critical of the Agency, but in the end neither committee
recommended that the Agency be abolished. The Church committee, more respected
then the Pike committee despite its own share of controversy, had its final report
released and gained support for reforming the Agency. * In that report the committee
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did not decide to preclude all future covert actions even though that option was strongly
considered. Many of the Church committee's suggestions were enacted into law.
The Year of Intelligence resulted in the formation of two oversight committees
on intelligence one in both the House and Senate. The Year of Intelligence also resulted
in a significant reduction in covert actions. President Ford announced an executive
order banning assassinations as well as the planning or the conspiracy to commit such
deeds, while the Carter administration drastically cut back on covert actions. Carter
appointed former Admiral Stansfield Turner to head the CIA. Turner made deep cuts in
the covert side of the agency, some even called the cuts a massacre which gutted the
agencies covert and human intelligence capabilities. Congress under Carter had few
problems overseeing covert actions. When Carter later stepped up covert actions
Congress remained friendly to the president's wishes even after a failed attempt to save
hostages in Iran. Oversight remained a friendly process until DCI Casey. Casey
would embroil the Agency again in controversy over Nicaragua and Iran-Contra.
Congress would look at the CIA and point out needed reforms. Now that the Soviet
Union has faded from the scene Congress is, once again, investigating the CIA.

End of the Cold War

Though the end of the Cold War does not mean the end of history as Fukayama
would insist, it does have significant effects on the international scene.2 For the U.S.,
its sworn enemy is now merely a defeated friend after more than four decades of
indirect hostility. It also leaves the United States as the lone superpower and the UN as
a more powerful enforcer of international norms. Most importantly, it calls for a
complete reexamination of the country's national security apparatus.
The Central Intelligence Agency was a creation of the Cold War. The agency
became a "third way" to fight the Soviets, a middle road between diplomacy and open
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warfare. Retired CIA officer Theodore Shackley refers to the term as the "third
option," an option he advocates.^ It appeared too dangerous to engage the Soviets
directly. In the worst of scenarios a confrontation would mean nuclear war. Therefore
the Agency would attempt to engage the Soviets.
The Cold War also meant a tremendous amount of spending on national
security. Indeed the term national security began to expand. Soon almost any
spending could be justified in terms of national security.^ Today items ranging from
"Star Wars" research to economic espionage by the CIA are defended as essential to
national security. Still much of this emphasis on national security relied on the Soviet
Union as the supreme threat; drug lords and small time dictators no longer provide the
implicit threat of destruction. The emphasis on defense and related spending is certain
to decline, especially now that the United States has moved into the role of a debtor
nation and has significant economic competition in world markets from Germany and
Japan.
The end of the Cold War means an end to almost unlimited defense spending.
In a country with trillions of dollars of public debt, there is little room for a heavily
funded intelligence sector. The CIA will face budget cutting as will the entire military.
Indeed the CIA's budget has been shrinking with the decline in the defense budget.
Though CIA directors such as James Woolsey have continued to try to hold off budget
cuts, they are coming. ^

Reform the 5 Paths

With the end of the Cold War, the CIA is once again under the unwelcome glare
of public examination. Scores of articles on reforming or even terminating the CIA
have been written in newspapers and popular magazines. In the halls of Congress
Senators and Congressmen have called for reform. The basis of all this attention is that
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the central protagonist of the CIA, the Soviet Union, no longer exists. Since the Soviet
Union was the basis for much of the CIA's work, what need is there for it now? It
would seem to be a perfect time for reexamination.
Much of the discussion of the CIA's role revolves around intelligence. There
are many expectations of a billion dollar intelligence agency such as the CIA. Failures
in recent predictions such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait have led to harsh criticism,
especially as the CIA is being expected to get by with less money. And according to
members of Congress the cuts are still on the table. The former chair of the House
Intelligence Committee stated in the spring of 1994 that "if the agency expects the CIA
authorization bill to reflect the status quo of pervious years, it has to have another
thought coming. "6 The single greatest intelligence failure by the CIA has been the
failure to predict the downfall of the Soviet Union. With all of the intelligence focused
on the Soviet Union the CIA missed the boat. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan puts its,
"for a quarter-century, they told the president everything there was to know about the
Soviet Union, excepting the fact that it was collapsing. They missed that detail. "7
There are many critiques of the agency in its present form. Some suggest that it
is an agency without an adversary, an agency that should be regulated to the dustbin of
history with other Cold War relics. Others argue that while the need for covert actions
has lessened greatly, there is still a need for the intelligence collecting and the analytical
side of the agency. Some even argue that in the times ahead the CIA will need to be
expanded to combat a myriad of new threats from drugs to terrorists. From the
perspective of covert actions these future plans for the CIA can be broken into five
groups. First, are those who would like to see the CIA expand its role moving into
more covert actions against varied threats such as terrorists or drug cartels as well as
moving into the realm of economic espionage. Second, is the group who would leave
the CIA alone despite the end of the Cold War. Third, is the group who would slightly
reform the CIA and drastically cut back on the large scale covert actions, especially
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paramilitary actions. Fourth, the group who would break up the CIA along operational
and intelligence gathering lines, leaving covert actions generally to the Pentagon. Fifth,
is the group who would call for an end to covert actions or even an end to the CIA.
Covert actions would not simply be moved to another agency, but dropped altogether
while entertaining the possibility that overt operations could still be carried out by the
military or other agencies like the State Department. All of these five groups have
significant arguments.

Retaining the CIA in a New More Dangerous World

There are arguments lodged at the end of the Cold War that the world is now a
vast, dark room haunted by ghosts and phantoms. In a bipolar world the threats were
simple, but now threats can erupt from anywhere. While implying that the Cold War
was "the "best of all worlds" may be an exaggeration; bipolarity did offer important
advantages to the American intelligence community. "8 It afforded the United States the
luxury of throwing all intelligence resources at one large target, the Soviet Union.
According to James Woolsey, former DCI under President Clinton, "we have slain a
large dragon. But we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of
poisonous snakes. "9 In this new post-Cold War world the CIA has many new, smaller
enemies.
This school, which includes a large number of CIA personnel, argues that the
CIA needs to look at expanding the intelligence role as well as the possibility of
expanding covert actions. Its defenders see the need for increased spending on the CIA
to offset reductions in military

s p e n d in g .

10 They want more spending on the CIA in

human intelligence as well as technical intelligence. 11 The agency has found new roles
to play as well. In the future the Agency will be involved in combating drugs, nuclear
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proliferation, terrorists, and possibly even economic espionage. Still many critics see
this as an attempt to justify its own existence. 12
Given the CIA's record in dealing with drug traffickers, is it really a good idea
to let the CIA get involved in stamping out drugs? A case can be made that the CIA
"needs to spend less time around the honey pot of narcotics, not more." 13 The golden
triangle became the world's largest opium producing region during the Vietnam war.
One of the leading drug traffickers in the region is General Vang Pao, the leader of the
CIA's Laotian secret army. The golden crescent largely within Afghanistan has become
the second largest opium producing region. One of the leading traffickers there is
Hekmatyar, a the CIA supported leader of one Mujahideen faction. The CIA has also
allegedly been involved with other groups who were dealing in illegal drugs including
the Contras in Nicaragua. So trying to move the CIA into a new role of drug enforcer
is quite a change from the Agency's general policy of looking the other way. Is the
whole argument of giving more funds to the CIA merely a argument to save the CIA
bureaucracy from budget cuts?
Essentially the creation of new tasks for the CIA is an old fashioned tactic of
any bureaucracy, the need to find a new mission to justify the its existence. Roger
Morris, a former NSC official under both Johnson and Nixon, initiated the attack on
the CIA's new justifications for existence. In a New York Times' article Roger Morris
wrote:
To preserve and extend that expanding domain while much of its rationale disappears, the CIA
has begun to advertise new perils of the post-Cold War period-international narcotics,
terrorism, industrial espionage, even the spread of chemical weapons. In each field, however,
the agency's own performance has been inept if not worse...[On reform plans] Like high
priests railing at an end to superstition, the professionals will call such a plan heresy,
impossible. If only they could tell us that the danger were really gone, they have always said.
Only then could we change this obese, tunnel-vision relic, slouching toward Capitol Hill for
still more money, still more ominous briefings on a world already past. 14

It is a harsh criticism of the Agency, but possibly a valid one. Obviously the CIA was
not created to operate in a world without the Soviet Union. In an effort to find a new
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worthwhile bogeyman, the CIA may be doing the country a disservice. 1^ still the new
arenas for the CIA are valid concerns even if the CIA is not the right agency for the job.
Many critics of the Agency acknowledge that some of its new tasks are valid.
While agreeing the drug mission is not a valid mission for the CIA, since "its officers
neither like it nor are they particularly good at it," Loch Johnson argues that they can
play an effective role combating terrorism. 16 Since counterterrorism relies heavily on
intelligence it is a natural area for the CIA to expand into according to Johnson. Still
how large a role this will be for the CIA remains to be seen. Terrorism, despite the
bombing of the Oklahoma federal building and the World Trade Center, is a rather
small concern compared to keeping track of the Soviet Union and all of the KGB
in trig u e s .

17 in 1989 only 35 Americans were killed abroad by terrorists. 18 Spending

billions on counterterrorism may be unjustified given the current level of the threat
Roy Godson, a long standing defender of the CIA, argues that these critics of
the CIA's mission are damaging, perhaps fatally, the CIA's covert action capability.
Godson accepts the thesis that covert actions are a justifiable tool of statecraft. He
refers to the mood of CIA critics today as "exceptionalism." Exceptionalism "holds that
covert action should not be engaged in unless there are grave and unusual
circumstances—the definition of which varies from one exceptionalist to another." 19
He divides the critics into two schools, those who disagree generally with the
compatibility of covert actions and democratic rule and those who regard covert actions
as a third way between diplomacy and open warfare. Godson argues that both of these
positions are wrong. Covert actions should only be undertaken when there is a clear
policy behind them. The early years of the Cold War demonstrate how covert actions
can be properly conducted.
As the United States emerges from the Cold War, Godson sees a dangerous
predicament. If the U.S. does not heed the warning signs it could be in for an
unwelcome fate:
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Letting counterintelligence and covert action capabilities lapse may not prove fatal, given the
advantages the United States enjoys today with respect to the world's other powers.
Nevertheless, diminished counterintelligence and covert action capabilities raise the cost of
exercising that advantage by reducing the tools a president has on hand to address national
security problems, short of waging war. Moreover, American dominance is unlikely to go
untested forever; the Hitlers and Stalins of the world have not vanished with the end of the
twentieth century. When the test does come, a weak U.S. counterintelligence and covert
action capability could be much more than a mere hindrance. It might prove a catalyst for
disaster-as it has for many others throughout world history .20

It is indeed a dire warning. If the United States lets its covert actions capabilities lapse,
as it did to some extent in the last half of the 1970s, the country could fall under the
boot of some modem day Hitler. Still the U.S. successfully survived the downsizing
of covert actions under Carter and retooled quickly enough to launch two large scale
covert actions in Afghanistan and Nicaragua. Currently covert actions have lapsed
again; no shadows of any large scale program have emerged. Godson argues that the
current trend towards de-emphasizing the role of covert actions is wrong, an arguable
position, but his contention that the United States could collapse due to a lack of covert
action capability and counterintelligence appears to be overstated.
There is an honest fear that the post-Cold War world may be dangerous enough
to justify an enhanced intelligence agency. 21 Many also see problems in the Gulf or
the former Yugoslavia as areas where covert actions can be pursued without the fear of
Russian interference. An argument can be made that increasing economic espionage
can have dramatic benefits for U.S. business. But if all of these programs were so
useful, why were they not conducted during the Cold War? The CIA often overlooked
drug production and dealing, made little noise about nuclear proliferation in Israel and
Pakistan, and helped arm terrorists such as the Contras. Obviously it is quite favorable
for the CIA to find new missions now that it is without an adversary.
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Status Quo

A second school argues for largely keeping the CIA intact with some minor
reforms. This school is well reflected by former DCI Webster. They are differentiated
from other critics who largely defend the agency, but hope for a very minor role for
covert actions. Webster, typical of a bureaucratic chief, argues for slow reforms, but
that nothing is essentially wrong: "as far as covert action [is concerned], I've tried to
make this point: the procedures are already there. We need only people who will follow
the procedures ... I believe very firmly in maintaining a covert-action capability in this
a g e n c y ." 2 2

Essentially the argument here is that despite some problems, the CIA has

been largely on the right track all along.
Defenders of the CIA argue that the large scale reforms being suggested go too
far. And outright elimination of the CIA is simply beyond the pale. Samuel B. Hoff, a
professor at Delaware State University concludes:
The Central Intelligence Agency should be trimmed down, not put down; it must retain its
traditional concentration on analysis and operations in the international sphere, not at home;
and it must train able and honorable personnel who share a commitment to advancing our
country's interests while adhering to laws, cultural norms, and accepted practices. In this
manner, the CIA can facilitate congruence between the purpose and outcome of foreign and
national security p o l i c y . 2 3

There is nothing significantly wrong with the CIA according to Hoff. The CIA should
be trimmed down since there is less money in the budget and because the Soviet Union
has disappeared. Past offenses or even recent ones such as Nicaragua and the "failure"
to predict the invasion of Kuwait merit only new attention to high standards. If the
agency's personnel can learn to closely follow high standards, the past failures will
largely evaporate. What is needed is merely an emphasis on good management.
One Agency defender, John Horton, argues against many of the suggestions to
radically alter the agency. He states that while it might be tempting to take operations
out of the CIA and put them in some other agency, it would never work. It would be
dangerous because the personnel would have nothing better to do than to justify their

own existence, by pushing for more and more covert actions. It would be "so
expensive that neither the executive nor the Congress would abide by it. "24 Finally,
the United States should not make the mistake of separating the two clandestine
services as during the days of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). There were
chronic battles between the CIA and the OPC "over personnel, salries, and status"25
and difficulties arising from having covert actions run by two different agencies. The
CIA staffed and housed OPC while having no control over them. This difficult
situation continued until 1952 when the OPC was brought under the CIA's authority.
In the end, only the historical argument is convincing, Horton's protests about the cost
of a separate organization and the fear that it would always be plotting to increase covert
actions, could be applied equally well to today's CIA.26
Many in this school worry that cutting back on covert actions would mean that
the U.S. would only be able to respond to situations with diplomacy or all out war.
While conceding that "many activities that would have been conducted covertly will be
conducted in an overt or semi-overt manner," Andrew C. Tuttle worries that this new
situation for covert actions is dangerous since they are "essential to the security interests
of the state. "27 The Carter administration's de-emphasizing of covert actions before
the Afghanistan invasion is often cited. Some argue like John Ranelagh that by de
emphasizing covert actions, the United States will be repeating a failed experiment that
took place under Carter and Turner. When covert actions were played down, the
United States looked weak and had little option in responding to events such as the
hostage crisis in Iran. Ranelagh even attributes part of Ronald Reagan's 1980 victory
to an electorate disturbed by the emasculating of the CIA.28 Thus the United States
should never abandon the covert action tool, nor regulate it to only occasional use under
rare circumstances.
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Moderate Reform

A common argument in reforming the CIA centers around covert actions.
Couldn't the agency simply de-emphasize covert actions? George Ball, a member of
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, believes that "in principle, we ought to
discourage the idea of fighting secret wars or even initiating most covert

a c tio n s .

"29

Even members of the CIA have often wished that covert actions were not a part of the
Agency's

m is s io n .3 0

In particular members of the intelligence directorate commonly

rail against the "cowboys" in operations who constantly embarrass the entire Agency.
Indeed Clark Clifford, who helped draft the legislation creating the CIA, explains that
the Agency has drifted off course away from "the original concept of an intelligencecoordinating

ag en cy . "31

Many would like the CIA to return to its original emphasis

even if covert actions are retained.
Another argument in favor of reducing covert actions centers around the ethics
of such ventures. While the Cold War justified many unseemly activities, the basis for
engaging in these acts now has significantly lessened. According to the Doolittle
Committee, a committee formed by President Eisenhower to make recommendations on
covert actions, since the Soviet Union was willing to use almost any means to destroy
the West, "acceptable norms of human conduct do not

a p p ly .

"32 Without the Cold

War, these acceptable norms of human conduct should again be applied to covert
actions. Seen in this light, policies that are without public support and involve extreme
measures are unlikely to be approved. Nicaragua is an example of one operation that
would be extremely difficult to justify without the Cold War setting, even then the
operation was highly controversial. Chile is another that seems unlikely to occur again
today, especially the excesses of Track II which involved even assassination plots. On
the other hand, an operation such as Afghanistan could still be supported, possibly with
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some modifications. Still many contend that despite the new heightened ethical
concerns some covert operations would be approved.
James Barry, a Deputy Director of the CIA's Center for the Study of
Intelligence, states that some covert actions can still be justified. A "once compelling,
anti-communist rationale for covert action has lost all validity. But this is not to say that
the United States should eschew the method of covert a c t i o n . "33 According to Barry
by applying just war theory to covert actions a reasonable calculus could be set up. It
would fit all the following criteria: approval by president and appropriate members of
Congress, intentions clearly spelled out, reasonable, and just, other means would not
be effective, a reasonable probability of success, and the methods envisioned are
commensurate with the o b j e c t i v e s . 34 Obviously these standards would greatly reduce
the number of covert actions attempted, and also tend to make large scale covert actions
quite difficult to justify. Still Barry is not alone in his insistence that "covert
interventions abroad should be less f r e q u e n t . "35
In another study of the ethics of covert actions Arthur S. Hulnick and Daniel W.
Mattausch attempt to apply ethical theories to covert actions. Examining just war theory
and shared expectations theory they come to the conclusion that "assassination and aid
to criminals or terrorists" fall well outside the ethics of a democratic nation, and that
even for a great power, "the fact that other countries do such things to us does not
justify similar activity on our part."36 They suggest that it may be possible for a
democratic nation to engage in such acts, but there must be a public policy consensus.
Without public consensus such generally immoral acts cannot be attempted.
Loch Johnson, a Church Committee staffer and now Regents Professor at the
University of Georgia, wants covert actions to be reined in, suggesting the best way of
doing so is by Congressional oversight. For Johnson, "like original sin, covert action
is unlikely to

d is a p p e a r .

"37 He does, however, suggest some guidelines for future

operations in the post-Cold War environment. There are four basic thresholds for
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covert actions in order of seriousness: routine intelligence operations, modest
intrusions, major intrusions, and extreme options. Major intrusions include election
interference and the supplying to arms to rebels. Extreme options range from providing
sophisticated weapons to rebels—Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen—to arranging coup
d'dtats. Johnson would essentially ban extreme options:
In almost all cases, reject secret wars, coup d'6tat and other extreme measures, for if America's
interests are so jeopardized as to require major forceful intervention, properly authorized overt
warfare—ideally, multinational in nature and at the invitation of a legitimate government or
faction- is a mere appropriate and honorable o p t i o n . 3 8

Major intrusions would be allowed, but only for compelling reasons. Johnson hopes
that under the watchful eye of Congressional oversight, the CIA could return to its
primary task of collecting intelligence and stay out of the covert action arena. Under
Johnson's proposals Nicaragua likely never would have been attempted, while
Afghanistan would have been run overtly, probably by the Pentagon.
Gregory Treverton, like Johnson a member of the Church committee staff, also
has reservations about covert actions. According to Treverton "there needs to be a
higher threshold for the use of covert action, ... the circumstances in which major
covert action makes sense as policy are sharply l i m

ite d .

"39 Like Johnson, Treverton

has a series of standards to meet before an action should be considered by policy
makers. Every policy maker should be able to answer three "what if?" questions before
undertaking a covert action. What if it becomes public? What if it does not succeed?
What signal will be received, by whom and with what result?^® The effect of these
questions is to sharply limit large scale actions as well as to favor smaller covert actions
such as propaganda which can answer all three questions positively.
Many critics of the CIA, who still see a need for retaining the CIA in its present
form, agree that covert actions should be judiciously scaled back. For this group covert
actions should only be attempted as a last resort.41 Charles G. Cogan of Harvard
sums up the thinking on covert actions:
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Finally, there is the fundamental question of whether we need covert action now that the Cold
War is over. Already, in the real world, the budgets for covert action are but a small fraction
of what they were in the 1980s at the height of regional conflicts. The era of the "900-pound
gorilla" that was covert action is largely a thing of the past. I think there is a sort of wise
men's consensus that covert action should be done, but only very sparingly and only in
response to paramount national interests.42

The sort of large scale paramilitary adventures undertaken in the 1980s no longer apply.
Even agency employees such as John B. Chomeua argue that "if real muscle is needed
and the U.S. government is willing to undertake what in most cases amounts to an act
of war, then the appropriate response becomes the use of either conventional military
force or of forces specializing in low intensity conflict

( L I C ) ." 4 3

At the end of the

Cold War the rationale for major covert actions may have finally expired.

Cracking the Institution

Daniel Patrick Moynihan's proposal for reforming the CIA goes far beyond
anything the influential senator has done before. At one point in the early 1980s
Moynihan’s proposals for reforming the CIA were largely borrowed from the Agency
itself. Moynihan was willing to let many problems in the CIA slide during the Cold
War since "it was the K

G B ,

not the CIA, which threatens d e m

o c r a c y ." ^

Still by the

end of the Cold War, Moynihan would turn from being a mild critic to an actual foe of
the Agency.
Moynihan's gripe with the CIA essentially came down to the failure to predict
the fall of the Soviet Union. Rolling Stone reporter, Eric Alterman, describes
Moynihan’s attack on the agency as "a one man

jih a d ." 4 5

Ever since Moynihan

became aware of the enormity of the CIA's misreading of the state of the Soviet
economy, he has had nothing but contempt for the agency. His argument is that if the
CIA couldn't produce worthwhile intelligence on the country's primary enemy, how
can it be expected to do anything right While Moynihan's proposal might have initially

121
been expected "not to pass" when it was proposed in 1991, by 1994 the "End of the
Cold War Act" would "be revisited, not just with one, but two, and many others"
voicing

s u p p o r t.4 6

abolished in his l i f e t i m

Still even Moynihan is aware that the CIA is unlikely to be
e .^

Moynihan's plan seeks to end the CIA as an agency and to move its
responsibilities to the State Department and the Pentagon. Moynihan's plan contains
four basic goals:
1. Disband the analysis directorate, whose functions are largely overlapped by the State
Department and the Pentagon.
2. Split up the National Reconnaissance Office, "which buys satellites whether we need
them or not,” into imagery and communications intercept divisions.
3. Reorganize and rename the operations division and "put it someplace else." [Under the
Pentagon]
4. Keep the director of central intelligence to oversee budget issues and intelligence
targets.48

Obviously the CIA would come to an end under the Moynihan proposal. Still his
proposal may have defined the middle ground on the intelligence debate. Moynihan's
proposal began to gather steam again with the Ames scandal, Guatemala, and even the
CIA briefing on Aristide implying that he had been a mental patient As it turned out no
one had checked their facts and there was no direct evidence of any hospitalization of
Aristide. The CIA was accused by Senator Tom Harkin of trying to sabotage Aristide,
a fair criticism according to a senior CIA official.^ These incidents led to the creation
of the Aspin Commission to recommend what is to be done with the agency in the
future.
Another radical reform plan that came out recently is the Gates plan. Long a
CIA insider, and a DCI under Bush, Gates has his own plans for the CIA. Under the
Gates plan the CIA would turn covert actions over to the military, the CIA would be
responsible for only Russia, China, regional powers, and conflicts, terrorism, and
proliferation. The CIA would also turn over all satellite intelligence to a new agency,
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and the CIA would cut the number of

s p ie s .5 0

Gates' plan retains the CIA while

greatly reducing its role. His plan also closely resembles the plan of Stansfield Turner
who would break up the agency by making the Directorate of Operations a separate
A g e n c y . Dave McCurdy, the former Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee,

follows closely the Gates suggestions emphasizing that analysts should be
institutionally separated from covert action, to the degree p o s s i b l e . 5 2
Robert Gates, a controversial figure while serving in the CIA, was not exactly a
likely source for a radical reform proposal. While in the CIA Gates was accused of
selective ignorance of the Iran-Contra affair which happened on his watch. Gates also
helped to produce the intelligence reports on the Soviet Union that would later so
infuriate Senator Moynihan. Finally, Gates was often accused of cooking the books to
provide support for enhanced defense spending under Reagan and Bush. Senator
Edward Kennedy describes Gates' record as "one of a cold warrior who skewed
intelligence to fit his or his superiors' view of the world. He ignored the biggest
scandal of the decade, intimidated those who disagreed with his views, and ignored the
crumbling of the Soviet Union long after it began. "53 Still many now look to the Gates
plan as a likely successor for Moynihan's proposals. While it retains the CIA, it
implements many of the reforms Moynihan proposed, significantly, putting covert
actions under the military. His plan is now considered the front runner of the radical
reform p l a n s . 5 4
There are other reform plans similar to Moynihan's and Gates' that are not
being widely circulated in Washington. Marcus Raskin, a Senior Fellow at the Institute
for Policy Studies, has another radical reform plan for the CIA. The plan includes
opening up the secrecy that shrouds the agency and sharing intelligence with the United
Nations. Its most important feature is its insistence that the CIA's paramilitary
operations be put under the Department of Defense, which would "subject them to
scrutiny and civilian c o n t r o l . " 5 5 All of these plans share a similarity in acknowledging
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that the CIA would be better off separating intelligence from covert action. As many of
them put the operation under the Pentagon, there is a sense that in the business of
paramilitary actions, the Pentagon is a better place for operations.
John Prados, who has written a history of covert actions, agrees essentially
with Moynihan, Gates, and Raskin. Having cited reasons for the failure of covert
paramilitary actions under the CIA from the creation of artificial oppositions to
informational leaks, Prados presents his solution:
One measure that could help clarify the legal status of paramilitary action would be to end the
CIA role altogether and put the function squarely within the purview of military specialwarfare forces. This would ensure maintenance of the capability for wartime, when it has been
demonstrated historically to be most effective, and reduce the propensity to use this technique
against the Third World in the service as some Cold War strategy.56

There is an inherent danger, according to Prados, in letting presidents conduct secret
wars with little oversight. By putting paramilitary operations under a military
command, there would no longer be a means for a president to abuse the power
inherent in the operations side of the CIA.
The advantages of the Pentagon are twofold. The Pentagon is subject to well
established civilian control unlike the CIA which still breeds distrust among Congress.
Many members of Congress probably feel that oversight of covert operations will be
significantly easier under the military. Indeed, frustrated by the Iran-Contra affair
Congress pointed out that "this country has been fortunate to have a military that is
sensitive to the constraints built into the Constitution."^ The implication was that
hopefully in the future the CIA could learn to be more like the military, more
accountable to elected officials other then the president. The military also has built in
expertise in paramilitary actions, far more so then the CIA ever attained. The special
forces of the military are trained in complex paramilitary manuvers. The Pentagon
regularly sends many military advisors to other nations sometimes providing advisors
to signifigant rebel movements in those countries. In addition the armed forces of
many nations are brought to the United States for specialized training as provided by
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special schools such as the infamous School of the Americas in Columbus, Georgia.
Running paramilitary operations is a professional responsibility in the military which
will not disappear when covert actions calm down for a period of years.
Finally, if covert actions are to be run as "overt" covert actions or simply out in
the open, then the military can certainly be called upon. There is little point in waging a
secret war that is essentially open knowledge to the Congress, to the American people,
and to the target nation. Essentially many recent covert actions such as Nicaragua and
Afghanistan have been simply undeclared wars. The Pentagon has been called on in
many recent cases such as Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait to intervene in other nations.
In Afghanistan and Nicaragua the Pentagon could merely have played the role of arms
supplier and adviser.

Certainly assigning operations, especially paramilitary

operations, to the military is not unthinkable.
There are some distinct problems with turning over covert actions to the
military. Since the military conducts primarily overt missions, they make a big splash
when they go in. Another danger associated with this relates to using the armed forces
of the United States in any situation. While a country may be willing to tolerate some
CIA interference without declaring war on the United States itself, the same cannot be
said if the U.S. military is behind the action. Putting the military in an operation tips
the scales closer to outright warfare. Another problem relating to the Pentagon’s size is
flexibility. The military cannot be flexible as a small Agency such as the CIA which
has only a few thousand employees deveoted to covert actions. The Pentagon would
have some difficulty in staying out of a burecratic rut with regard to covert actions, a
situation that is much less difficult for the smaller CIA buracracy. Still the Pentagon,
despite difficulties, could certainly shoulder the additional task of covert actions.
Many of the CIA's covert functions have been taken over by overt agencies.
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has recently taken over many of the
election functions that the CIA once conducted covertly. A good example of covert
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functions being replaced by overt measures is the Voice of America, which is now run
overtly though initially its funding was secretive. According to William Robinson of
the Center for International Studies:
Political aid programs—formerly conducted by the CIA with limited success and
sophistication-have now come in from the cold. "It is not necessary to turn to the covert
approach," commented former CIA Director William Colby in regard to the NED program.
"Many of the programs which...were conducted as covert operations [can now be] conducted
quite openly, and consequentially without controversy."^

If political action can be conducted openly, then as Colby says there is no controversy
involved. For the CIA and the government non-controversial operations are a
significant advantage over traditional CIA operations which often become steeped in
controversy when revealed. If many of the political actions of the CIA can be
conducted openly and paramilitary actions can be conducted by the military, then there
may be little need for an active covert action arm of the CIA.

Abolishing Covert Actions or the Agency

Moynihan's proposal does not define the extreme edge of opinion on reforming
the CIA. Some have called for a complete end to covert actions or even a complete end
to the CIA. And the CIA would not simply be broken up into smaller pieces like the
Moynihan plan, but secret intelligence would cease to exist. It is not the first time that
there have been calls for termination, but with the demise of the Soviet threat, the CIA's
raison d'etre, such attacks carry more weight.
Even media institutions generally supportive of government such as The New
York Times have come out against covert actions. On February 1,1993 the editorial
board of The New York Times suggested that it was time to re-examine covert actions
to determine "whether they have any use at all. "59 it was a time to decide whether
covert actions "are truly necessary, and to explore in every case whether democracy is
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better promoted

o p e n l y . "60

Certainly such an editorial suggests a general mood in

favor of eliminating covert actions, at least among media elite.
Editors are not the only opponents of retaining covert action capability in the
future. Morton Halperin, a former member of the NSC under Nixon, argues that
covert actions should be abolished by the United States. He contends that covert
actions get around the necessary public debate over policy. Covert actions cannot be
openly discussed and agreed upon and thus they serve no purpose in a democracy.
Halperin believes that "the United States ought not to engage in covert wars or in covert
operations designed to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. "61 Halperin
suggests that intervention would still be possible in cases that the public would support
such as Afghanistan. The intervention would merely be a subject of public debate and
knowledge, surely making little difference in an "overt" covert operation like
Afghanistan. The details of the operation would not be needed, but a general
consensus support for a project would be necessary. In Afghanistan the question
would be whether or not the United States should support the Mujahideen. Then the
operation could be debated like any other foreign policy issue in Congress, the media,
and among the public. Thus the CIA would be out of the covert business in regards to
running operations supposedly hidden or at least plausibly deniable.
Others are more critical of the entire agency, covert actions included. Their
solution is simply to end the CIA as it stands without dispersing its various functions to
other government agencies. Representative Ron Dellums declared in 1980 that "we
should totally dismantle every intelligence agency in this country piece by piece, nail by
nail, brick by b r i c k . " 6 2 Some leftist critics of the agency argue it is time to do just this.
The editors of The Progressive declare that "this is not the time to reform the CIA. It is
the time to shut it d o w n . " 6 3 Kevin Kelley of the Utne Reader as well argues that "the
Central Intelligence Agency may stand out as the ultimate example of a bureaucracy
whose life span has been pointlessly p r o l o n g e d . " 6 4 These critics are not alone.

Ill

Many former employees of the agency such as John Stockwell and Philip Agee
have become famous, or infamous in the CIA's view, for publishing damaging reports
of just what goes on within the CIA, most importantly what goes on in the operations
directorate. Morally outraged at the practices they saw and performed they argued that
the CIA should be abolished. Stockwell, an operational specialist, worked with the
Agency through the Angola o p e r a t i o n . 6 5 Philip Agee probably the harshest critic of the
CIA, now residing in Britain, exposed the CIA in his 1975 bestseller, Inside the
Company: CIA Diary.66 Agee is easily the most controversial of former CIA
employees having published individual agents names. Both of them agree in general
that the CIA ought to be abolished. They contend that the CIA has consistently lied to
Congress, engaged in bloody covert actions and assassinations, and generally hidden a
host of problems under a veil of secrecy. Stockwell even refers to Gregory Treverton's
book length criticism of covert actions as a "restrained critique. "67 The two obviously
see no future for the CIA. For Stockwell and Agee the CIA should be ended as soon as
possible.

Final Conclusions

For the purposes of this study, the contentious debate over intelligence is less
important. What is important is covert actions, in particular large covert actions.
Examining the two largest and most public covert actions of the 1980s should provide
some lessons for policy makers looking at the fate of future covert actions.
The cases of Afghanistan and Nicaragua help to cast further doubts on the
ultimate usefulness of covert actions. There have been no flawless successes in the
history of the CIA's covert actions. By the standards used in this study there have
certainly been successes. Operations in Iran and Guatemala would certainly be ranked
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as successes, but these same standards would make for a long list of failures beginning
with Indonesia in 1957 "one of the CIA's first major covert-action failures."^
Admittedly, large scale covert actions are difficult ventures often with
unpredictable long term consequences. The very nature of a secret intervention in
another country invites difficulty. Still the CIA cannot claim many successes at large
scale covert actions, especially of a paramilitary nature. Election interference has been
more successful though it has its share of failures as well. The overall success rate of
covert actions is not high.
The outcome of the Nicaragua case is not surprising. Nicaragua was a
contentious issue throughout the 1980s. It was a case argued before the American
public which never gained majority support. When the CIA was legally separated from
the operation, Reagan and Casey were willing to continue aiding the Contras despite the
illegality of the venture. The Contras never had widespread support among the
Nicaraguan population. While the Sandinistas may have lost much of their initial
popularity after bringing down Somoza, they were still widely supported as contrasted
with the National Guard led Contras. Eventually after a decade of almost open warfare
the United States succeeded in removing the Sandinistas from power by free elections,
though they were heavily bought by American money, and threats of renewing aid to
the Contras. Nicaragua never met the measure of a clear and supportable policy, and
the rationale behind keeping the operation covert was less then convincing.
Afghanistan is perhaps a different story. Many consider the Afghanistan
operation at least to be an "arguable success. "69 Many cold warriors consider
Afghanistan much more than arguable; they consider Afghanistan an example of
Reagan standing up to the Soviets and helping to bring down the entire communist
system. Still by the standards set forth in chapter II Afghanistan is a mild failure.
These same standards are weighted in favor of U.S. interests, from a more neutral

position Afghanistan would appear to be a greater failure.
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As a mild failure,

Afghanistan is a convincing argument that large scale covert actions have failed.
At this point some general conclusions can be drawn from the evidence. Both
the case studies involved proxy armies fighting against perceived communists, the
Sandinistas in one case and the Soviets in the other. Both case studies took place at the
end of the Cold War. And finally, both case were failures. Looking at the reform
plans now on the table, one can make several suggestions. Three basic courses of
action are warranted in regards to covert action.
First, it seems likely that at the very least the CIA needs to seriously consider
lessening emphasis on covert actions. There may very well be success stories in covert
actions, but the two largest covert actions of the last decade were not. Many of the
plans stressing moderate reforms include emphasis on cutting back on covert actions.
Covert actions as pursued under Carter seem a relatively successful model. Under
Carter there were no major controversial operations. While it is true that both the
Nicaragua and Afghan operations started under the Carter administration, they were
small operations with limited objectives. Under Reagan both of the operations would
expand at a dramatic pace and ultimately fail. Carter's only major covert action failure
was an attempt to rescue hostages in Iran. If the past few years are any indication then
covert actions are once again in decline, the only publicly rumored actions were in Haiti
and Bosnia.
Future covert actions should be conducted only in extreme cases where keeping
the intervention covert is absolutely necessary to success. Even if this is the case there
needs to be clear policy goals set forth, and public support for the objectives. Public
support for the objectives may mean simply full Congressional knowledge by the
relevant committees, or if basic policy goals can be debated without jeopardizing the
action then the case should be brought before the public at large for debate. Nicaragua
would have never been approved under these standards, and the country may have been
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better off. Afghanistan would never have met the need for covertness though it could
have easily been ran overtly with debate over the general running of the aid program to
the Mujahideen.
Second, the Pentagon could easily take over paramilitary covert actions, the
most controversial of all interventions. Moving operations out of the CIA would allow
the CIA to concentrate fully on intelligence without the constant controversy brought on
by operations. The Pentagon has a history of civilian oversight and cooperation with
Congress that the CIA has lacked. As mentioned before the Pentagon is fully capable
of running professional paramilitary campaigns. Covert operations that have been ran
semi-overtly could now be ran with the full acknowledgment of the U.S. role. Some
other operations initially ran by the CIA covertly have now been moved out of the CIA
and conducted in the open. The NED is a prime example of removing CIA functions
such as election interference and transferring them to a public agency which freely
acknowledges the U.S. hand in its operations. Most large scale covert actions by the
CIA have lost their true covert status. The world obviously knew even many details of
both the Afghan and Nicaraguan operations.
By running paramilitary covert actions overtly out of the Pentagon or even
covertly the CIA would stand to gain back significant respect. Had Nicaragua been
conducted by the Pentagon instead of the CIA, it likely would have been more
successful. There have been similar missions conducted by the military in Latin
America most notably in Panama and Grenada. Still the likelihood in the case of
Nicaragua is that it never would have been attempted. The Contras did not present a
significant military force capable of overthrowing the Sandinista regime. That would
have meant an invasion by Pentagon forces would have been necessary, an extremely
unlikely possibility considering the public mood towards such a military adventure. In
the case of Afghanistan the military would have been useful. It is unlikely that the
Pentagon would have let the Pakistanis have such incredible influence on the
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Mujahideen. The Pentagon would have insisted on U.S. planning of operations and
training of the Mujahideen if the project was U.S. financed. An operation run by the
Pentagon instead of the CIA could have been far more successful considering the
amount of corruption in the Pakistani military and the incredible portion of the aid that
was stolen by the Pakistanis. In summary there is a powerful argument that if the
country is to keep its covert action potential intact, secret operations should be farmed
out to the Pentagon.
Finally, there is the possibility of banning covert actions altogether. This would
mean an end to large scale actions which involve secret intervention in the affairs of
other nations. This course has the advantage of meeting high ethical standards, much
as the banning of assassinations by President Ford brought some respect back to the
Agency. It would end the CIA's most controversial mission and bring renewed focus
to intelligence. While it remains an unlikely prospect, it could well be followed in
practice if not in principle in the future. If presidents take it upon themselves to use
covert actions sparingly or not at all then the effect would be almost the same as a
complete ban on covert actions.
As the 17 members of the Aspin Commission prepare their report on the
intelligence community and suggest reforms in the CIA they should strongly consider
the more radical reform plans.70 As the two case studies indicate the latest large scale
covert actions have not been very successful ventures. The most damning case is
Afghanistan which is often considered a CIA success. If an operation like Afghanistan
can be a mild failure then there is a genuine need to consider just how useful covert
actions are, especially at the end of the Cold War. Aspin has promised to "start with a
blank piece of paper" and stick to the best solution to the problem even if that means
"abolishing the agency."71 Still the commission appears to be another attempt to save
the CIA—recommending mild reforms but leaving the basic institution intact. That
would be a tragic mistake.
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